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Against Fiduciary Utopianism: The 
Regulation of Physician Conflicts of 
Interest and Standards of Care 
Sam F. Halabi* 
This Article critically examines calls by scholars, legislators, and regulators advocating 
the imposition of fiduciary duties upon a broad range of actors including judges, jurors, 
agencies, parents, friends, and even entire countries. The Article examines the  
physician-patient relationship—an archetypal and frequently cited relationship in which 
fiduciary duties, administered by courts, are asserted to work well. It argues that some of the 
most significant problems fiduciary duties are used to address like asymmetry of information, 
conflicts of interest, and professional conduct have not only been handled badly by courts, but 
have actually found more effective resolution through legislative fact-finding, acknowledgment 
of the complexity of medical practice, and ultimately regulatory solutions aimed at sources of 
conflicts of interest and specific circumstances in which claims for medical malpractice arise. 
Behind many of these initiatives are physicians themselves—who experience the sources of 
potential conflicts and endeavor to create self-regulatory and legislative solutions to them. In 
contrast, court-administered fiduciary duties are often marginalized as judicially manageable 
claims related to the duties of loyalty and the duty of care converge, litigants focus on settlement, 
and the high expectations held for fiduciaries are rarely enforced. The Article concludes that 
not only may imposing more fiduciary duties on more relationships not generate the benefits 
many scholars suggest, but that doing so will stymie more targeted and effective solutions to 
problems that occur in trust relationships.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Legal scholars, legislators, and regulators have in recent years undertaken an 
expansive effort to make agencies, judges, jurors, Medicare billers, friends, and even 
entire countries into fiduciaries to one or more constituencies, replete with duties 
of care, deliberation, good faith, and loyalty enforceable by judicial means.1 
 
1. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21(j) (2017) (requiring retirement plan advisors be fiduciaries); 
Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of Medicare, 104 
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Traditionally reserved for relationships in the nominally private sphere that 
nevertheless impacted public or quasi-public interests—e.g., attorneys and clients, 
directors and shareholders, guardians and wards—purported fiduciary duties now 
abound. This effort to stretch the fiduciary analogy promises more robust virtue, 
exercised by more of society’s actors, for the benefit of those locked out or 
marginalized by prevailing economic and political structures. 
These fiduciary duties, it is theorized, will make decision-makers more 
conscientious of stakeholders who trust them to act justly, add a stratum of judicially 
imposed oversight to ensure that those decision-makers do so, and promote 
transparency through the responsibility of fiduciaries to articulate reasons for their 
action or inaction, justify those reasons, and keep adequate records so that 
justifications may be subject to judicial or public scrutiny.2 These benefits will flow 
from the structure of the fiduciary relationship, especially its empowerment of the 
quintessentially informed, deliberative, beneficent fiduciary empowered by law to 
decide what is right. Fiduciaries’ discretion—the flexibility to decide—is inherently 
virtuous, as it is exercised with “superior information, experience, or expertise,” and 
done so for the welfare of their beneficiaries.3 
To be sure, scholarly inquiry encourages areas of law to be studied and then 
loaned or applied elsewhere, often beneficially so. Comparative constitutional law 
has played a substantial role in promoting the expansion of due process and  
right-to-life norms into constitutional frameworks drawn from heterogeneous 
traditions.4 Judges in common law countries routinely apply concepts developed in 
contract, employment, and corporate law to questions involving wills and trusts, 
divorce, and negligence.5 The notion of “duty” plays a prominent role in many of 
these contexts, as it does in the current movement encouraging the expansion of 
fiduciary duties outside their conventional private law domains.6 
Yet it is argued here that the expansion of the fiduciary metaphor has exceeded 
the limit of its beneficial application. It has become utopian—in the satirical sense 
 
CALIF. L. REV. 1043 (2016) (discussing how medical providers who bill Medicare are now 
fiduciaries); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125  
YALE L.J. 1820 (2016) (covering literature on public authorities theorized to be subject to fiduciary 
constraints including judges, regulators, and states in the international system); Ethan J. Leib, Friends 
as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009) (friends); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary  
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010); 
Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009). 
2. Criddle, supra note 1, at 469. 
3. Id. at 471. 
4. Sam F. Halabi, Constitutional Borrowing as Jurisprudential and Political Doctrine in Shri  
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 3 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 73 (2013); see also David 
Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013). 
5. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002); Donald  
C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87 
(1999); Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1139 (2013). 
6. Rhee, supra note 5. 
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intended by Sir Thomas More—a place literally too good to be true.7 Like Plato’s 
Republic, the world of fiduciaries empowers a multitude of benign oligarchs, 
“philosopher-kings,” whose contemplative, beneficent, and transparent decisions 
will salvage the world torn asunder by ugly partisan lawmaking, opportunistic 
contracting behavior, and decreasing judicial oversight of shrinking legal duties 
between citizens.  
If the policies and reforms advocated by fiduciary utopians rendered benign 
or unimportant inefficiencies, it might not be worth an article-length contribution. 
But the criticism presented herein goes beyond those leveled by scholars like Seth 
Davis, who doubts that fiduciary norms may be applied in contexts where there is 
not a “discrete class of beneficiaries,” or Ethan Leib and Stephen Galoob, who 
argue that applications of fiduciary theory to public authorities is conceptually 
ambiguous and undisciplined.8  
Rather, this Article argues that the application of fiduciary duties to more legal 
relationships distracts from lawmaking and law-enforcement processes that lead to 
more effective solutions to the problems that fiduciary duties are asserted to solve. 
For example, imposing a broad “duty of loyalty” on a class of political authorities 
undermines the fact-gathering and policy process that leads to targeted solutions 
where concrete, identifiable problems emerge. The “loyalty” of corporate directors 
is not under threat by ambiguous, poorly understood sources that require broad 
duties. It is under threat by the temptation to use corporate assets for personal gain 
or to exploit opportunities that rightfully belong to the corporation.9 Although 
ERISA-covered employers are fiduciaries with respect to the decisions they make 
when implementing health and benefit plans for their employees, the actual 
requirements for their conduct are determined largely through statute and  
notice-and-comment rulemaking.10 
 
7. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (George M. Logan, Robert M. Adams & Clarence H. Miller  
eds., 2006). 
8. Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1158 
(2014); Leib & Galoob, supra note 1, at 1846; see also Mark Osiel, Rights to Do Grave Wrong, 5 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 107, 165–67 (2013) (analyzing the distinction between metaphorical and legal invocations of 
the fiduciary, especially by Jeremy Waldron); Sean P. Sullivan, Powers, But How Much Power? Game 
Theory and the Nondelegation Principle, 104 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1254–55 (2018) (analyzing Congress’s 
delegation of authority to agencies as representative of the fiduciary relationship between principal  
and agent). 
9. Despite well-developed Delaware case law on director conflicts of interest, most states, 
including Delaware, adopt a statutory approach to managing them. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,  
§ 144 (2017); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2020); Gregory H. Shill, The Golden Leash and 
the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1246, 1256–59, 1261–64 (2017). As Robert Anderson 
and Derek Muller have argued in the attorney context, gatekeeping the profession itself is a legitimate 
alternative for ensuring the behavior of fiduciaries. Robert Anderson IV & Derek T. Muller, The High 
Cost of Lowering the Bar, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 307 (2019). 
10. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY 
RESPONSIBILITIES (2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/
resource-center/publications/meeting-your-fiduciary-responsibilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW6S-
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The evidence in support of this argument is one of the storied fiduciary 
relationships in law—the doctor-patient relationship. Determined from the time of 
ancient Athens to be fiduciaries with respect to those they heal, physicians are 
required by law to use their specialized skills for the benefit of patients without 
regard to personal gain; to do so according to the degree of skill and care that would 
ordinarily be exercised by a physician in similar circumstances; to keep records that 
justify the treatment decisions they order; and to maintain the confidences and 
sensitive information with which they are entrusted. Indeed, physicians are among 
the most admired and respected professions for precisely these reasons.11 
But physicians’ adherence to these principles of fiduciary behavior have not 
resulted from broadly drawn duties of loyalty, care, and confidence enforced by 
similarly sage judges in federal and state courts. Rather, they have resulted from 
specific, targeted laws and regulations—the development of which physicians 
themselves as well as patients have participated and shaped. Transparency in the 
conduct of medical treatment has resulted from “disclosure” and “sunshine” laws 
aimed not at physicians, but at those who would tempt them with costly drugs and 
therapies that may not benefit their patients.12 Patient confidence has been secured 
by state and federal laws that understand that just because physicians are expertly 
trained and care about their patients does not mean that they know all the ways that 
privacy may be breached.13  
In short, rather than the learned, discretion-wielding heroes suggested by 
much of the recent literature on fiduciaries, the behavior of physicians toward their 
patients has been shaped by legislators, regulators, and physicians themselves who 
understand that notwithstanding their extensive training, physicians care for 
patients in a complex world of finance, health, illness, and treatment that 
conventional lawmaking processes can and should address.14 The ambitious 
 
TARY]; Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 321–23 (2009) (summarizing ERISA’s reach). 
11. Niall McCarthy, America’s Most and Least Trusted Professions, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2018, 7:54 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/01/04/americas-most-and-least-trusted-
professions-infographic/#38b8e1df65b5 [https://perma.cc/7HSY-5L5S]; Dayna Bowen Matthew, 
Implementing American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. Rᴇᴠ. 715, 730 (2011) 
(“Physicians in Ancient Greece organized themselves into a professional guild, in which members 
shared professional principles most famously articulated sometime during the fourth century B.C. by 
the Greek medical philosopher Hippocrates. Hippocrates wrote the oath which required new physicians 
to swear upon Apollo and a number of healing gods to uphold the ethical principles of their  
profession: ‘I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider 
for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous.’”  
(footnote omitted)). 
12. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124  
Stat. 119, 689 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7h); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 24173(c) (West 2006). 
13. Julie K. Taitsman, Christi Macrina Grimm & Shantanu Agrawal, Protecting Patient Privacy 
and Data Security, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 977 (2013). 
14. SHARON P. DOUGLAS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CEJA REP. NO. 1-A-12, REPORTS OF THE 
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS 2 (2012), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-
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application of more fiduciary duties to more actors in society falsely promises a 
greater level of “trust” by those actors than even conventional fiduciaries have ever 
been able to deliver.  
Moreover, at least in those contexts in which courts are understood to better 
police fiduciary principles, there are good reasons to doubt that they will be better 
positioned to enforce fiduciary principles applied to more relationships. The passive 
recipients of competitively generated evidence and information, litigation is a poor 
substitute for the fact-finding and community engagement undertaken in legislative 
and administrative processes. For both substantive and process reasons,  
court-administered duties are not likely to generate better social outcomes. To be 
sure, judicially identified fiduciary duties may be codified by legislatures which may 
in turn inform later iterations of rules and standards for fiduciaries’ conduct, 
discretion, and good faith. But doing so frequently depends on a sufficiently 
aggrieved beneficiary to adequately complain. Given the context in which breaches 
of fiduciary duty arise, there are good reasons to doubt that level of grievance will 
be sufficiently frequent, robust, or optimal. 
Part I of this Article assesses the existing literature addressing fiduciary duties 
and promoting their proliferation. Part II explains the history and structure of 
fiduciary relationships generally and the physician-patient relationship specifically. 
Part III surveys state and federal laws addressing the physician-patient relationship. 
Part IV analyzes the policy gains achieved through application of fiduciary duties 
and through legislative or regulatory approaches. Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
I. THE ORIGIN, STRUCTURE, AND EXPANSION OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 
A. The Role of Fiduciary Relationships in Law 
Fiduciary relationships are favored under law when they promote a special 
trust between parties that benefits society generally. In those relationships, one 
party (the entrustor) is dependent upon another party (the fiduciary) for some 
service that “public policy encourages.”15 Fiduciary duties are “imposed when 
public policy encourages specialization in particular services . . . and when the 
entrustors’ costs of specifying and monitoring the fiduciaries’ functions threaten to 
 
assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/about-ama/councils/Council%20Reports/council-on-
ethics-and-judicial-affairs/ceja-1a12.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7T5-RYLJ ] (“Arguments that 
physicians should never allow considerations other than the welfare of the patient before them to 
influence their professional recommendations and treatment do not mesh with the reality of clinical 
practice. Physicians regularly work with a variety of limits on care: clinical practice guidelines, patient 
preferences, availability of certain services, the benefits covered by a patient’s insurance plan, and the 
time physicians and nurses can spend caring for a patient all influence what interventions physicians 
recommend and what care they provide.”). 
15. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 127, 127 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also Thomas P. Gallanis, The Contribution 
of Fiduciary Law, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 388, 390–94 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013). 
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undermine the utility of the relationship to entrustors.”16 In other words, fiduciaries 
are at their most desirable when entrustors lack the time, resources, or capability to 
(1) do what fiduciaries can do and/or (2) effectively monitor them when they’re 
doing it.17 The duty is supposed to give entrustors “incentives to enter into fiduciary 
relationships,” which is done by “reducing entrustors’ risks and costs of preventing 
abuse of entrusted power, and of ensuring quality fiduciary services.”18 In return 
for the cost to fiduciaries for carrying out their duties, the law “increases their 
marketability by endowing them with a reputation for honesty backed by 
reputation.”19 However, the main purpose of the relationship is not to “satisfy both 
parties’ needs, but only those of the entrustor.”20  
Fiduciary duties are comprise of broadly applicable standards which courts 
then complete with more specific rules. According to Robert Sitkoff, 
[i]n all fiduciary relationships we find general duties of loyalty and care, 
typically phrased as standards, which proscribe conflicts of interest and 
prescribe an objective standard of care. But we also find specific subsidiary 
fiduciary duties, often phrased as rules, that elaborate on the application of 
the duties of loyalty and care to commonly recurring circumstances in the 
particular form of fiduciary relationship.21 
The duty of loyalty is the “core” fiduciary duty, the obligation to act toward 
the entrustor or beneficiary without regard to one’s personal interest, to act 
unselfishly.22 Because fiduciary relationships “trade upon high levels of trust and 
leave one party in a position of domination, inferiority, or vulnerability,” the 
“fiduciary is prohibited from engaging in self-interested transactions” and pursues 
the interests of her beneficiary above her own.23 The fiduciary must be undivided 
and undiluted in this fidelity. “The duty of loyalty proscribes misappropriation and 
regulates conflicts of interest by requiring a fiduciary to act in the ‘best’ or even 
‘sole’ interests of the [beneficiary].”24 
 
16. Frankel, supra note 15, at 128. 
17. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource  
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, 
Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105 (2011); Michael A. Perino, A 
Scandalous Perversion of Trust: Modern Lessons from the Early History of Congressional Insider Trading, 
67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 335 (2015); E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a Public 
Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 
63 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1975). 
18. Frankel, supra note 15, at 128. 
19. Id. 
20. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 801 (1983). 
21. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 198 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); see also 
Hall, supra note 5, at 491 (“Instead, general principles of fiduciary obligation give rise to various sets of 
rules in many different settings in which the rules share only broad, familial resemblance.”). 
22. Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). 
23. Leib, supra note 1, at 672–74. 
24. Sitkoff, supra note 21, at 201. 
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Practically speaking, the duty of loyalty “requires fiduciaries to . . . avoid 
conflicts of interest, secret profits, and misappropriating benefits that should accrue 
to the beneficiary.”25 This highest duty applies to a wide range of private law 
relationships: attorney-client, corporate director-shareholders, trustee-beneficiary, 
agent-principal, guardian-ward, and physician-patient.26  
The second duty that is commonly included as part of a fiduciary relationship 
is the duty of care.27 This duty is similar to the duty of loyalty in that it requires the 
fiduciary to act in an unselfish manner, yet, “unlike the duty of loyalty, the party 
alleging a breach must be able to show that an injury resulted from the fiduciary’s 
failure to meet the standard of care.”28 The fiduciary duty of care can range widely 
in content, dependent as it is on the conduct of what courts expect of similarly 
situated fiduciaries and the factual specificity of decisions they make.29 
The third duty is that of utmost candor and disclosure.30 This duty requires 
fiduciaries to reveal the reasons supporting the actions they take with respect to 
beneficiaries and, when tied to the duty of loyalty, may further require fiduciaries 
to disclose influences or interests that may affect the objectivity of their advice or 
actions.31 Physicians, for example, must disclose the risks of the therapies they 
advise to their patients; corporate directors must “provide stockholders with 
accurate and complete information material to a transaction or other corporate 
event that is being presented to them for action.”32  
In many fiduciary relationships, like attorney-client and physician-patient, 
beneficiaries are also protected by a duty of confidentiality.33 The fiduciary has the 
duty not to misappropriate the information for the fiduciary’s own use (the duty of 
 
25. Leib, supra note 1, at 674. 
26. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 
114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005). 
27. Leib, supra note 1, at 674. 
28. Id.  
29. See Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A 
Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235 (1994); William A. Gregory, The Fiduciary 
Duty of Care: A Perversion of Words, 38 AKRON L. REV. 181, 182 (2005) (“It has become commonplace 
for courts and commentators to refer to the ‘fiduciary duty of care.’ The three most egregious examples 
of this confusing rhetoric are the Delaware corporate law cases, the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), 
and the legal malpractice cases that consider the concept of ‘fiduciary breach’ by an attorney.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
30. John F. Mariani, Christopher W. Kammerer & Nancy Guffey-Landers, Understanding 
Fiduciary Duty, 84 FLA. BAR J. 21 (2010). 
31. Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1056 (Md. 1999) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 389 (AM. L. INST. 1958) as authority for an agent’s obligation to her principal 
to disclose any information the principal would reasonably want to know). 
32. Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and 
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1198 (2003) (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998)).  
33. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (finding 
that the physician-patient relation is fiduciary); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591  
(Wash. 1967); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
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loyalty) but also a separate duty to keep the information itself confidential.34 An 
attorney, for example, may not use information learned in the course of a 
representation adversely to the client’s interest and also may not communicate 
confidential information to others.35 Generally, a fiduciary may disclose protected 
information “only in accordance with certain procedural and substantive safeguards, 
chief among them full and fair disclosure by the fiduciary.”36  
Fiduciaries are ultimately bound to their entrustors by a duty of good faith, a 
duty that contracts or expands depending on the context in which it is applied.37 
Against corporate directors, for example, the duty is synonymous with that of 
loyalty.38 The fiduciary relationship between doctors and patients by contrast “arises 
from the trust and confidence patients place in physicians.”39 Leib asserts the duty 
of good faith is controversial either because “many have a hard time distinguishing 
a fiduciary’s duty of good faith from a general duty of good faith that pervades all 
performance of contractual duties,” or because “many feel that the duty of good 
faith is simply a way of expressing duties imposed by other obligations, like the duty 
of disclosure, the duty of loyalty, or the duty of care.”40  
B. The Expansion of Fiduciary Relationships 
So described, it is unsurprising that legislators, regulators, and legal scholars 
have advocated that fiduciary relationships apply to more actors in the legal system. 
Why wouldn’t we want more loyal, competent, discreet, and faithful legal, market, 
and social actors? As Leib argues, the concept of a fiduciary relationship “is  
self-consciously open, flexible, and adaptable to new kinds of relationships.”41 So 
why not do so?42 
 
34. See SUSAN R. MARTYN, BACK TO THE FUTURE: FIDUCIARY DUTY THEN AND NOW  
12–13, 21 (Lawrence J. Fox, Susan R. Martyn & Andrew S. Pollis eds., 2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2056401 [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20200326210936/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2056401 ]. 
35. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also Murfreesboro  
Med. Clinic v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005) (“In analyzing this issue, we see no practical 
difference between the practice of law and the practice of medicine. . . . These relationships are 
‘consensual, highly fiduciary and peculiarly depend[ent] on the patient’s or client’s trust and confidence 
in the physician consulted or attorney retained.’” (quoting Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1171 
(1978))), superseded by statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-148 (2016). 
36. Sitkoff, supra note 21, at 201.  
37. Gager v. Mathewson, 107 A. 1, 2–3 (Conn. 1919); see also Robert T. Miller, Lyondell 
Chemical Co. v. Ryan: The Duty of Good Faith Comes to Revlon-Land, 11 ENGAGE 14, 14 (2010) 
(analyzing the good faith component of the board’s duty of loyalty in the corporate context). 
38. Am. Fed. Grp., Ltd. v. Rothenberg, 136 F.3d 897, 906 (2d Cir. 1998). 
39. Matthew, supra note 11, at 726. 
40. Leib, supra note 1, at 676. 
41. Id. at 672.  
42. See McKnatt v. McKnatt, 93 A. 367, 370 (Del. Ch. 1915) (“There is no fixed test to establish 
a fiduciary relationship. It cannot be defined. It embraces the relation of physician and patient, nurse 
and patient, and generally all persons who are in any relation of trust and confidence.”). 
First to Printer_Halabi.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/30/20  11:15 AM 
442 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:433 
Indeed, Leib has answered his own invitation, arguing that fiduciary 
responsibilities should apply to judges, juries, and even friends.43 Evan Criddle and 
Evan Fox-Decent have advocated the use of fiduciary principles to identify rules in 
international relations that all states must obey like prohibitions on slavery, 
genocide, and aggressive war. They anchor their analysis in the “state’s fiduciary 
obligation to govern in accordance with principles of integrity, fairness, and 
solicitude.”44 Evan Criddle has separately argued for the adoption of a “fiduciary 
model” for agency rulemaking, one that requires regulators to honor the moral 
dignity of the individuals subject to their rules, do so with the integrity and fairness 
thought of as applying to fiduciaries, and to take action fairly, reasonably, and 
transparently. The fiduciary model Criddle advocates also expands the scope—as 
fiduciary duties do—for judicial review of agency action or inaction.45 
In an important paper aimed at addressing the problem of medical providers’ 
overbilling of Medicare, Isaac Buck has argued for a fiduciary duty between 
physicians and, effectively, taxpayers, so that Medicare may seek judicial remedies 
for physicians’ breach of the duty of loyalty to payers.46 According to Buck, the 
typical fiduciary duty that applies to physicians may be easily extended to  
other entrustors: 
After all, physicians occupy a position of trust, unlike the role one would 
ascribe to sellers in other industries. . . . [I]n a professional medical 
practice, trust between patient and physician is essential and . . . the 
government as insurer depends upon the honesty of the doctor and is easily 
taken advantage of if the doctor is not honest.47 
In 2016, the Department of Labor advocated the application of a fiduciary 
rule to investment advisers making recommendations pursuant to qualified 
retirement plans and individual retirement accounts.48 That rule redefined the term 
investment advice within pension and retirement plans. Under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; Pub. L. No. 93-406), a person 
who provides investment advice has a fiduciary obligation, which means that the 
person must provide the advice in the sole interest of plan participants.49 Under the 
prior regulation, securities brokers and dealers who provided services to retirement 
 
43. Leib, supra note 1; Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of 
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary 
Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109 (2014) (jurors and juries).  
44. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 1, at 333. 
45. Criddle, supra note 1. 
46. Buck, supra note 1, at 1055.  
47. Id. at 1089 (citing United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1294 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
48. Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 17-10238, 2018 WL 3301737 (5th Cir. June 
21, 2018), rev’g 231 F. Supp. 3d 152 (N.D. Tex. 2017); Mkt. Synergy Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 
No. 16-CV-4083-DDC-KGS, 2017 WL 661592 (D. Kan. Feb. 17, 2017). 
49. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/08/2016-07924/definition-of-the-term-fiduciary-conflict- 
of-interest-rule-retirement-investment-advice [https://perma.cc/3P6N-8DQX]. 
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plans and who were not fiduciaries were not required to act in the sole interests of 
plan participants by, for example, disclosing conflicts of interest.50 Rather, their 
recommendations had to meet a suitability standard, which requires that 
recommendations be suitable for the plan participant, given factors such as an 
individual’s income, risk tolerance, and investment objectives. The suitability 
standard is a lower standard than a fiduciary standard.51 Although the rule is now 
effectively dead, it represents a policy manifestation of the academic trends 
described above. 
The possibilities (and in some cases realities) are endless. Professors may be 
fiduciaries with respect to their students.52 Parents may be fiduciaries to their 
children.53 Employees are already fiduciaries in many respects for their employers 
when an agency relationship forms, but what about to each other? Physicians owe 
fiduciary duties to their patients, but what about pharmacists to their customers?54 
Joshua Margolis has argued that publicly traded healthcare firms owe fiduciary 
duties to both shareholders and patients.55 Internet and digital device users 
worldwide vest a certain and sometimes large amount of trust in online platforms, 
social media, and Internet service providers, so what about a fiduciary duty to 
ensure that privacy is maintained, breaches are protected against, and equal access 
to all web content (which now rescinded net neutrality rules were intended to 
address)?56 Tamar Frankel, one of the most important voices in the law of 
fiduciaries, has broadly “challenged lawmakers, lawyers, and judges to put trust and 
fiduciary duty at the heart of modern law.”57 
II. PHYSICIANS AS FIDUCIARIES 
Advocates of the expansion of fiduciary duties to more relationships 
frequently identify the physician-patient relationship as representative of the core 
features of what might be gained should the analogy be extended.58 The physician 
 
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). 
51. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21(j) (2017). 
52. Melissa Astala, Comment, Wronged by a Professor? Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Remedy in 
Intellectual Property Infringement Cases, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 31 (2003); Hazel Glenn Beh, Student 
Versus University: The University’s Implied Obligations of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59  
MD. L. REV. 183, 202–03 (2000); Robert Faulkner, Judicial Deference to University Decisions Not to Grant 
Degrees, Certificates, and Credit—The Fiduciary Alternative, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 837, 855–66 (1989); 
Alvin L. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students—A Fiduciary Theory, 54  
KY. L.J. 643 (1966).  
53. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995); 
K.M. v. H.M., [1992] S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
54. Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. 2001). 
55. Joshua D. Margolis, Professionalism, Fiduciary Duty, and Health-Related Business Leadership, 
313 JAMA 1819 (2015). 
56. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS  
L. REV. 1183 (2016). 
57. David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 
1012 (2011). 
58. See infra notes 61–65. 
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is the learned, competent, and compassionate professional exercising her expertise 
with the sole end of healing her patient (who knows little or nothing about disease 
and pharmacology), alleviating her pain, or advising her on different aspects of 
nutrition and wellness.59 This physician discloses all material risks of procedures and 
therapies, scrupulously guards confidences entrusted to her by her patient, and 
keeps detailed records that justify her decisions and advice.60 She treats her patient 
to the standard of care that other physicians would agree would meet professional 
expectations and does so free of financial or romantic interests that might cloud her 
judgment.61 Often described as the “gatekeepers” to medical services, physicians are 
in the position that makes patients reliant on them for access to medical aid, thus 
creating a relationship of dependency.62 Advocates argue their fiduciary duties 
“attach” at the beginning of the relationship—which is from the time the physician 
agrees to treat the patient—and carry on throughout the time a patient is under the 
physician’s care.63 
According to Tamar Frankel, the patient’s entrustment of power over his or 
her body to the physician—the essential trust of something vital—suffices to create 
a fiduciary relationship between the two.64 Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent 
argue that the physician is a fiduciary because “[the patient] is peculiarly vulnerable 
to the [physician]’s power in the sense that she is unable, either as a matter of fact 
or law, to exercise the entrusted power.”65 Health law scholars and professional 
organizations concur. Dayna Matthew argues that “[c]urrent applications of 
fiduciary law are pervasive in the medical context and are firmly based on the  
well-established ethical responsibilities that providers historically owed to their 
patients.”66 The American Medical Association (AMA) has recognized that the 
physician-patient relationship is “based on trust,” and thus the physician has an 
obligation to place patients’ welfare above her own self-interest.67 In a 
comprehensive analysis of physicians’ fiduciary duties under state law, Max 
 
59. M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851, 854 (Alaska 1998) (“[W]e have recognized that the 
unique nature of the physician-patient relationship confers upon physicians a fiduciary responsibility 
toward their patients.”). 
60. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to 
Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (2009). 
61. See Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Witherell v. Weimer, 421 
N.E.2d 869 (Ill. 1981), superseded by statute, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 13-215 (2019). 
62. Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 60, at 1186. 
63. Thomas H. Boyd, Cost Containment and the Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to the Patient, 39 
DEPAUL L. REV. 131, 137 (1989).  
64. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 17 (2011). 
65. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 1, at 349. 
66. Matthew, supra note 11, at 730. 
67. AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 1: Opinions on Patient-Physician Relationships, in CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS, at Op. 1.1.1 (2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-
medical-ethics-overview [https://perma.cc/UG3L-ZKP8].  
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Mehlman has argued that “regarding physicians as fiduciaries for their patients is 
essential not only for patients but for physicians.”68 
All of this more or less reflects reality, so far as it goes. 69 Physicians, especially 
in the United States, are among the most robustly trained and vetted professionals 
worldwide.70 They are indeed in a relationship of immense trust from frequently ill 
and vulnerable patients, and the potential conflicts of interest that might taint their 
decision-making are generally disclosed and transparent for patients to see and 
understand.71 Physicians and their supporting medical provider networks keep 
detailed records as to almost every step in the treatment process.72 The only part 
that is wrong is that it is the fiduciary relationship, legally enforced by courts, that 
has gotten us here.  
The following analysis examines what courts have stated physicians’ fiduciary 
duties include, whether or not those courts ever held physicians accountable for 
those duties. 
A. Physicians’ Duty of Loyalty 
For nearly all fiduciary relationships, the core duty is that of loyalty, to avoid 
conflicts of interest that may jeopardize the obligation of the fiduciary to act on 
behalf of the trustee alone.73 In the Republic, Plato wrote that “[N]o physician, in so 
far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good 
of his patient; for the true physician is . . . not a mere money-maker.”74 In 1760, 
fiduciary law was first adopted in colonial America to “protect patients in 
relationships with physician providers.”75  
As with many fiduciaries, the possible conflicts of interest are manifold, 
pervasive, and, for physicians, operate at both primary (payment to physicians for 
services) and secondary (profit for recommending drugs or devices in which the 
 
68. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH  
L. REV. 1, 57 (2015). 
69. See Jessica Mantel, A Defense of Physicians’ Gatekeeping Role: Balancing Patients’ Needs with 
Society’s Interests, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 633, 643–44 (2015).  
70. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Shortening Medical Training by 30%, 307 JAMA 
1143, 1144 (2012). 
71. Mehlman, supra note 68. 
72. Christine Sinsky, Lacey Colligan, Ling Li, Mirela Prgomet, Sam Reynolds, Lindsey Goeders, 
Johanna Westbrook, Michael Tutty & George Blike, Allocation of Physician Time in Ambulatory  
Practice: A Time and Motion Study in 4 Specialties, 165 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 753, 753–60 (2016), 
http://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2546704/allocation-physician-time-ambulatory-practice-time-motion- 
study-4-specialties [https://perma.cc/6AQU-7H6E]. 
73. State ex rel. McCloud v. Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (“Moreover, as this 
[fiduciary] duty contemplates the physician’s undivided loyalty to his patient, such duty necessarily runs 
contrary to the dual allegiance that would result if the physician were employed and paid by his  
patient’s adversary.”). 
74. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 17 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Cosimo Classics 2008) (1888). 
75. Matthew, supra note 11, at 719.  
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physician has a financial stake) levels. Frances Miller detailed the potential conflicts 
of interest that face physicians in modern practice:  
  At a fundamental level a patient’s best interests will not always coincide 
with what seems to be the physician’s most advantageous financial or 
professional position. Physicians are uniquely situated to persuade patients 
to purchase medical services, for patients rarely possess the sophisticated 
diagnostic skills that would prompt them to second guess physician advice. 
Moreover, when physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis, their income 
increases the more services they provide, regardless of whether the patient 
actually needs them. If the physician works for a profit-sharing 
independent practice association (IPA) or health maintenance organization 
(HMO), the fewer services he or she provides the more money the 
physician makes at the end of the year . . . . The . . . possibility of conflict 
of interest at this primary level is inevitable because of one or another of 
these economic incentives.  
  A different kind of conflict of interest . . . is involved when physicians 
derive secondary income from the care they order for their patients. This 
happens whenever physicians own substantial equity interests in medical 
service organizations to which they refer patients.76 
In their review of the evidence regarding physician conflicts of interest, 
Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose, and Aaron Kesselheim found that across 
specialties and therapies, physicians tended to order more diagnostics, tests, and 
procedures when they held a financial interest in the firms or facilities conducting 
those services.77 In some circumstances, these self-referrals were also associated 
with adverse patient outcomes.78 
Arguing for a fiduciary duty applicable between physicians and Medicare, 
Buck cites the preference for physicians to prescribe Lucentis, a drug used to treat 
age-related macular degeneration, to Avastin, a far cheaper drug that has been 
shown to be equally effective but which has not been equally prescribed.79 The 
reason for this is the incentive Medicare Part B creates by reimbursing the 
prescribing-physicians for the average price of the drug plus six percent every time 
they use it on a patient.80 Federal and state courts have acknowledged that “gifts or 
compensation from drug companies influence medical professionals’ treatment 
 
76. Frances H. Miller, Secondary Income from Recommended Treatment: Should Fiduciary Principles 
Constrain Physician Behavior?, in THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS 
IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIROMENT 153, 154–55 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1983), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK216764/ [https://perma.cc/N9EQ-TMM7]. 
77. See Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Effect of Financial 
Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
452, 463 (2012). 
78. See id. at 462–63.  
79. See Buck, supra note 1, at 1055. 
80. Id. at 1056 (noting that Lucentis gains the doctors $120 per dose versus Avastin at $3  
per dose).  
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decisions” in ways that implicate physicians’ fiduciary duty of loyalty.81 Yet courts 
have “resisted efforts” to allow patients to challenge physician conduct based on 
breach of that duty.82 
B. Physicians’ Duty of Candor 
Physicians’ duty of candor or disclosure is broad and includes not only 
revealing personal interests that may affect the objectivity of advice given or 
treatment recommended, but also material risks related to those prescriptions and 
informed consent more broadly.83 Originally involving nonconsensual touching of 
the body by a physician, informed consent was made actionable under the tort 
theory of battery, anchored as it is in the dignity that comes with bodily autonomy.84 
Battery theory emphasized that “every human being of adult years and sound mind 
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”85  
Since its first official appearance in 1957, informed consent has been 
significantly expanded.86 Now situated in medical negligence, a physician has a duty 
to disclose to a patient the material risks associated with a proposed procedure when 
a reasonable patient would need to hear that information to make an  
informed decision.87 
Indeed, patients have been far more successful at challenging physicians’ 
fiduciary duty of candor than the duty of loyalty because courts extend such 
deference to physicians’ treatment decisions and confuse fiduciary duty and 
 
81. Murthy v. Abbott Lab’ys, 847 F. Supp. 2d 958, 971, 972 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see Garcia  
v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 219, 221, 226 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). 
82. Hall, supra note 5, at 493. 
83. Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978) (“However, because of the fiduciary 
relationship between physician and patient, the scope of the disclosure required can be expanded by 
the patient’s instructions to the physician.”); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101–02 (Kan. 1960) 
(“The courts frequently state that the relation between the physician and his patient is a fiduciary one, 
and therefore the physician has an obligation to make a full and frank disclosure to the patient of all 
pertinent facts related to his illness.”); Jacobs v. Painter, 530 A.2d 231, 239 (Me. 1987) (“Dr. Painter’s 
duty to disclose arose, as it always has, from the fiduciary character of the physician-patient 
relationship.”); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (“[A] physician’s duty to 
disclose is . . . imposed by law which governs his conduct in the same manner as others in a similar 
fiduciary relationship.”). In the context of fiduciary duties more generally, Professor Thomas Gallanis 
has observed that “[a]cademic writing has concentrated on the other fiduciary duties, such as loyalty, 
prudence, and impartiality. The duty to inform is due for scholarly treatment.” T.P. Gallanis, The 
Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1596 (2007). 
84. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain A Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 69, 73, 77–78 (1994); Krista J. Sterken, Michael B. Van Sicklen & Norman Fost, Mandatory 
Informed Consent Disclosures in the Diagnostic Context: Sometimes Less Is More , 17  
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 107 (2013).  
85. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1912). See generally Sharon Nan 
Perley, From Control over One’s Body to Control over One’s Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of Informed 
Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 335 (1992). 
86. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). 
87. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing the first objective 
standard in informed consent cases). 
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malpractice inquiries (a point further developed in Part III).88 In the well-known 
case of Moore v. The Regents of the University of California, the patient sued the doctor 
who treated him for hairy cell leukemia, challenging the physician’s orders to 
remove his spleen as well as “blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily 
substances” as conflicted with the physician’s intent to use those substances in 
potentially lucrative clinical research.89 The Supreme Court of California in Moore 
determined that the physician had breached his fiduciary duty, not of loyalty, but of 
disclosure, since the economic interest of a physician may be material to a patient’s 
decision.90 “[A] physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure 
must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed 
consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether 
research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”91 
In that decision, the court adopted the “reasonable patient” standard when 
determining materiality.92 Most courts have in fact adopted a “reasonable physician” 
inquiry that operates much like a standard of care analysis privileging physicians’ 
opinions of one another, not the trust relationship they share with the patient.93 
Several courts have held that physicians have an affirmative duty to disclose 
information that will affect a patient’s care.94 For instance, not only do physicians 
have an affirmative duty to disclose to patients any financial interest in clinical 
research,95 some have “imposed a duty on physicians to reveal financial incentives 
received in a Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) contract to hold down 
costs by refusing to order additional tests or by making referrals to specialists.”96 In 
 
88. Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 389 P.2d 224, 228 (Idaho 1964) (“[I]t is now generally held that 
the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient imposes a duty of disclosure, breach of which 
constitutes fraudulent concealment.”); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 436–37  
(S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“The jurisdictions that recognize the duty of confidentiality have relied on various 
theories for the cause of action, including invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, medical 
malpractice, and breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of confidentiality.”). 
89. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.10 (Cal. 1990). 
90. Id. at 485.  
91. Id. 
92. Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 19 (2011); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (“The 
relationship between a doctor and his patient creates a duty in the physician to disclose to his patient 
any material information concerning the patient’s physical condition. This duty to inform stems from 
the fiduciary nature of the relationship . . . .”). 
93. 4 LEONARD J. NELSON III, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 22.05 (2020) (reporting that the 
reasonable patient standard “remains the minority position”). In states using the reasonable physician 
standard, a physician would only be required to disclose “an interest extraneous to the patient’s health” 
if other physicians customarily did so. Moore, 793 P.2d at 484. 
94. Emmett v. E. Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“We find in 
the fiducial qualities of that relationship [between physician and patient] the physician’s duty to reveal 
to the patient that which in his best interests it is important that he should know.”). 
95. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and 
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 242, 248 (2005). 
96. Richard W. Bourne, Medical Malpractice: Should Courts Force Doctors to Confess Their Own 
Negligence to Their Patients?, 61 ARK. L. REV. 621, 641 (citing Shea v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712, 717 (8th 
Cir. 2000)). 
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addition to holding HIV-infected physicians liable under an “informed-consent 
theory,” for treating patients without disclosing their HIV status, some courts have 
held that the “refusal of a physician to reveal financial or other interests is a breach 
of fiduciary duty.”97 Furthermore, physicians are required to disclose “emergent 
medical risks” to patients that they are either the cause of through medical error, or 
that they discover during the course of treatment of something unrelated to the 
emergent medical risk.98 The duty of candor is so strong, under the fiduciary 
relationship, that a few courts have concluded that failure to disclose is tantamount 
to active concealment.99  
C. Physicians’ Duty of Care 
Once the doctor-patient relationship is established, physicians, like attorneys, 
corporate directors, and other fiduciaries are under an obligation to perform their 
professional activities carefully and competently, generally as judged by the 
prevailing standards of professional competence in the relevant field of medicine.100 
While typically adjudicated as malpractice actions, courts have confirmed the duty 
of care as one of physicians’ fiduciary duties.101 
The distinction between deviation of the standard of care as a fiduciary and 
that of any other ordinary actor owing someone else a duty (ordinary negligence) is 
significant.102 Corporate directors and general partners, for example, must be guilty 
of “gross negligence” before courts will impose liability for violation of the fiduciary 
 
97. Id. at 641 (citing Moore, 793 P.2d at 485); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993); 
Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) 
(holding that disclosure of HIV-positive status was required under hospital’s informed-consent 
doctrine)). 
98. AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 8: Ethics for Physicians & the Health of the Community, in CODE 
OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 8.12. 
99. Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 895 (Ind. 1956) (“Usually, there must be some active effort 
on the part of one to be guilty of concealment but where a fiduciary or confidential relationship exists, 
such as physician-patient, there exists a duty to disclose material information between the parties and a 
failure to do so results in concealment.”); Daniel Sperling, (Re)disclosing Physician Financial  
Interests: Rebuilding Trust or Making Unreasonable Burdens on Physicians?, 20 MED. HEALTH CARE  
& PHILOS. 179, 181–82 (2017). 
100. Nestorowich v. Ricotta, 767 N.E.2d 125, 128 (N.Y. 2002). 
101. Toman v. Creighton Mem’l St. Josephs Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Neb. 1974) 
(“‘Malpractice’ has been defined by the court as the treatment of a case by a surgeon or physician in a 
manner contrary to the accepted rules and with injurious results to the patient; hence, any professional 
misconduct or any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or fiduciary 
duties.”); Georgetown Realty v. Home Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 7, 14 n.7 (Or. 1991) (“The form of action for 
a claim against a fiduciary for breaching a duty of care arising from the relationship is not materially 
different from a claim against a physician, a lawyer, or an engineer for breaching a duty of care arising 
from such a relationship.”). 
102. See, e.g., Christopher K. Odinet, The Unfinished Business of Dodd-Frank: Reforming the 
Mortgage Contract, 69 SMU L. REV. 653, 675–76 (2016) (analyzing the relevance of the absence of such 
a duty on lenders). 
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duty of care.103 For attorneys, physicians, and many other fiduciaries, courts have 
equated breaches of the fiduciary duty of care with malpractice, imposing ordinary 
negligence and preponderance of the evidence standards when adjudicating claims 
by beneficiaries.104 
After the physician relationship is established, the patient must prove the 
applicable standard of care and then establish the physician’s deviation from that 
standard to the patient’s detriment.105 Generally, the standard of care is the “degree 
of skill and care that would ordinarily be exercised by an average physician in similar 
circumstance.”106 Specialists are required to exercise a higher degree of skill and care 
in their area of expertise.107 Due to the complex nature of medical malpractice 
litigation, physicians are almost always retained to be expert witnesses.108  
The physician’s duty of care includes numerous related obligations.109 Those 
obligations include retention of a competent support staff, making and keeping 
adequate records, keeping current with diagnostic and treatment advances, and 
maintaining privileges with necessary healthcare facilities.110 These obligations 
clarify that physicians must minimize any potential interference with their ability to 
treat patients once the physician-patient relationship has been established. Doctors 
are also held to the duty of “technical competence,”111 which includes completing 
 
103. Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647, 653–54 
(2015); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767 (analyzing the 
adaptation of fiduciary duties in the benefit corporation context). 
104. Schieffer v. Cath. Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Neb. 1993) (holding that 
parishioner’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against priest was not actionable as it was “merely another 
way of alleging that the defendant grossly abused his pastoral role, that is, he engaged in malpractice”); 
Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 227, 258 (1985) (holding that trustee’s standard of 
care is determined by the circumstances of time and place that surrounded the trustee when he took or 
failed to take the action in question); Himel v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 596 F.2d 205, 209 n.4 
(7th Cir. 1979) (finding that under Illinois law, breach of fiduciary duty will result from violations of 
obligations of a trustee in carrying out the trust according to its terms of care and diligence in protecting 
and investing trust property and of exercising good faith); Wright v. Nimmons, 641  
F. Supp. 1391, 1402 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that a trustee must exercise at least that degree of care 
that a reasonably prudent person would devote to his own affairs under like circumstances). 
105. Meghan C. O’Connor, The Physician-Patient Relationship and the Professional Standard of 
Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principles to Achieve the Goals of Tort Reform, 46 TORT TRIAL  
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 109, 117 (2010). 
106. John W. Ely, Arthur J. Hartz, Paul A. James & Cynda A. Johnnson, Determining the 
Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice: The Physician’s Perspective, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861,  
862 (2002). 
107. Cara E. Davies & Randi Zlotnik Shaul, Physician’s Legal Duty of Care and Legal Right to 
Refuse to Work During a Pandemic, 18 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 167, 167 (2010). 
108. Chris Taylor, The Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Determining Standard of Care, 35  
J. LEGAL MED. 273, 273 (2014). 
109. Stigliano v. Connaught Lab’ys, Inc., 658 A.2d 715, 720 (N.J. 1995) (“The relationship 
between treating physicians and their patients, sometimes described as fiduciary in nature, gives rise to 
a duty to testify in judicial proceedings about treatment rendered to the patient.”). 
110. Boyd, supra note 63, at 139. 
111. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 249. 
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continuing education courses and consulting outside medical professions  
“when indicated.”112 
D. Physicians’ Duty of Confidentiality 
The fiduciary relationship between doctors and patients “arises from the trust 
and confidence patients place in physicians to operate in good faith, remain loyal to 
their patients, and subordinate their own self-interest and the interests of others.”113 
While professional canons also speak to the duty of confidentiality, courts have also 
read that obligation to be part of the broader fiduciary duties that physicians owe 
patients.114 Because trust is essential to the functioning of the fiduciary relationship, 
confidence provides an important assurance to the entrustor seeking advice.115 
Throughout treatment, the physician is bound to “ensure the confidentiality of the 
relationship, and, most significantly, to provide a level of care that meets accepted 
standards in the profession.”116 Unauthorized disclosures of patient information are 
actionable for damages precisely to ensure the integrity of physician-patient 
communications.117  
As with duties of loyalty and candor, courts have developed exceptions. Marc 
Rodwin has noted that while “[p]sychiatrists owe loyalty to their patients” they are 
also expected to abrogate that loyalty under certain circumstances that pose risks to 
the safety of others118 In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme 
Court of California determined that mental health physicians must protect third 
parties threatened with bodily harm by their patients, including through 
disclosure.119 In addition, physicians are required to report certain contagious 
diseases, and physicians whose patients have HIV are “ethically obligated to divulge 
 
112. AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra 
note 67, https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/principles-of-medical-
ethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEQ6-RJNF]. 
113. Matthew, supra note 11, at 726. 
114. McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“A majority of the 
jurisdictions faced with the issue have recognized a cause of action against a physician for the 
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information unless the disclosure is compelled by law or is in 
the patient’s interest or the public interest.”). 
115. Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Resources: Is 
There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 369 (1993); Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 354  
(Fla. 2002) (“These cases are also persuasive authority and support our conclusion that a 
psychotherapist who has created a fiduciary relationship with his client owes that client a duty of 
confidentiality, and that a breach of such duty is actionable in tort.”); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 
30, 34 (Mich. 1991); Parris v. Limes, 277 P.3d 1259, 1265 n.3 (Okla. 2012) (“Oklahoma has long 
recognized that the relationship between a physician and patient is a fiduciary and  
confidential relationship.”). 
116. Boyd, supra note 63, at 137. 
117. Tehven v. Job Serv. N.D., 488 N.W.2d 48, 51 (N.D. 1992) (“Courts have generally 
recognized a patient’s right to recover damages from a physician for unauthorized disclosure of medical 
information as . . . [a] breach of the fiduciary relationship between a physician and a patient.”). 
118. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 251–52. 
119. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345–46 (Cal. 1976). 
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a patient’s confidences and warn sexual partners known to be at risk  
of contagion.”120  
E. Physicians’ Duty of Good Faith 
Broadly, courts have encompassed physicians’ fiduciary duties with an 
ultimate obligation to act in good faith.121 Courts have admonished physicians not 
only “to act in their patients’ best interest [as part of their fiduciary duty],” but to 
also “deal fairly with their patients, while eschewing kickbacks, excessive services, 
and improper referrals.”122 The latter breaches of good faith, as in the corporate 
context, overlap significantly with the duty of loyalty. As Dayna Bowen Matthew 
notes, the good faith and fair dealing aspect of physicians’ fiduciary duties have 
been given central importance by courts: 
Some courts have a long-established history of acknowledging the 
fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship in medical 
malpractice cases, holding that the provider’s fiduciary duty arises from the 
trust and confidence patients place in physicians to operate in good faith, 
remain loyal to their patients, and subordinate their own self-interest and 
the interests of others.123 
III. THE LIMITATIONS AND STRUCTURAL INCAPACITY OF COURTS TO REMEDY 
BREACHES OF PHYSICIANS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Despite the lofty rhetoric courts attach to the fiduciary relationship between 
physicians and patients, they have been largely reluctant to enforce fiduciary duties, 
per se, against physicians. Indeed, prominent scholars of the physician-patient 
relationship have noted the actual application of a physician’s fiduciary duty is 
“sparse”124 and rarely applied in such a way as to vindicate the relationship as a truly 
fiduciary one.125 Numerous structural factors explain why courts hesitate to fully 
 
120. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 252; Ad Hoc Comm. on Med. Ethics, American College of 
Physicians Ethics Manual. Part I: History of Medical Ethics, The Physician and the Patient, The Physician’s 
Relationship to Other Physicians, The Physician and Society, 101 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 129, 134 
(1984), cited in Mehlman, supra note 68, at 9 n.8. 
121. Black v. Littlejohn, 325 S.E.2d 469, 482 (N.C. 1985) (“The relationship of patient and 
physician is generally considered a fiduciary one, imposing upon the physician the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing.”); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991) (“The 
physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one based on trust and confidence and obligating the 
physician to exercise good faith.”). 
122. Matthew, supra note 11, at 728–29. 
123. Id. at 726. 
124. Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 60, at 1167. 
125. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 255; Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking 
the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 459–68 (2000) (describing 
challenges to physicians’ loyalty); see also Mehlman, supra note 68, at 10 n.9 (noting that in three  
states—Alabama, Delaware, and Minnesota—courts have rejected the fiduciary metaphor for the 
physician-patient relationship). 
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execute the relationship, factors that would apply with equal force to the 
proliferating regimes advocates of more fiduciary duties now propose. 
A. The Rules of Civil Procedure Confound Fiduciary Duties 
Under both federal and state rules of civil procedure, plaintiffs must bring all 
their claims arising out of the same transactional nucleus of facts in the same civil 
action.126 Judicial efficiency and res judicata favor disposition of cases 
comprehensively so that litigation ends once the rights of the parties have been 
determined.127 In the case of patients with claims against physicians, they will by 
these principles be required to bring common law claims in contract and other torts, 
as they do, in addition to claims for breach of fiduciary duty.128 These former claims 
often have advantageous features from the perspective of trial judges—more 
questions are clearly factual and reserved for the jury; fewer equitable remedies that 
require judicial intervention; and clearer law, especially binding judicial precedent. 
Remedies for breaches of fiduciary duties require far more extensive 
involvement of courts in private law relationships than remedies available in 
common law actions sounding in contract or other tort claims.129 Disgorgement, 
for example, would require the court to undertake a thorough examination of the 
profits made by a disloyal physician, whereas compensatory damages in a 
malpractice action require only an assessment of the evidence a patient-plaintiff 
would submit through the normal discovery and trial process.130 As Einer Elhauge 
concluded in the antitrust context, “the rare usage of disgorgement actions thus 
seems to have been based mainly on a general premise that private actions already 
 
126. William A. Fletcher, “Common Nucleus of Operative Fact” and Defensive Set-Off: Beyond the 
Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 171 (1998) (“Under the influence of modern procedural rules encouraging 
liberal joinder of parties and claims, the size of a permissible unit of litigation has substantially increased 
in this century. In both state and federal courts the goal of these joinder rules has been to foster 
procedural fairness and judicial efficiency, ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)). 
127. Albrecht Zeuner & Harald Koch, Effects of Judgments (Res Judicata), in 16 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ONLINE ¶ 25 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 
2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2589-4021_IECO_COM_160903 [https://perma.cc/6NXP-
LGK6] (“The main purpose inherent in the concept of res judicata is to ensure that once a matter has 
been decided further controversy or uncertainty about it is eliminated. This implies on the procedural 
level that the rendering of an inconsistent decision concerning the same subject matter must be 
prevented. For as long as the possibility remains that a different judgment may be rendered in a new 
proceeding, legal certainty has not yet been achieved and the litigation is not yet finally concluded.”). 
128. See, e.g., Stephen R. Feldman & Thomas M. Ward, Psychotherapeutic Injury: Reshaping the 
Implied Contract as an Alternative to Malpractice, 58 N.C. L. REV. 63, 77 (1979). 
129.  Mary C. Burdette & Scott D. Weber, Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 1 (June  
26–28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.dallasprobatelawfirm.com/documents/ 
Remedies-For-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3BW-GJHF]. 
130. ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. 2010) (“[C]ourts may 
fashion equitable remedies such as profit disgorgement and fee forfeiture to remedy a breach of 
fiduciary duty.”). 
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provide adequate monetary relief, so that disgorgement claims would not provide 
an additional benefit.”131 
B. Courts Reject Patients’ Fiduciary Duty Claims 
Courts routinely reject attempts by patients to vindicate fiduciary duties owed 
to them by physicians in favor of medical malpractice suits that feature adversarial 
discovery, jury determinations, and passive involvement of judges. This is true for 
all the duties identified above. In Hales v. Pittman, the Arizona Supreme Court was 
explicit in its preference for medical malpractice rather than breach of fiduciary duty 
actions for breach of the duty of candor: 
Additionally, if an undisclosed risk occurs, a patient may pursue a 
malpractice action premised on a negligence theory. We do not believe that 
the law in Arizona should be extended to recognize a new cause of action 
based on breach of trust when an adequate remedy for this case already 
exists. To do otherwise would ignore the underlying premise that the 
patient controls his own destiny.132  
Interpreting Kansas law, a federal district court declared that all physician 
fiduciary duties were subsumed by medical malpractice actions based on the same 
acts or omissions: 
Under Kansas law, a plaintiff who brings a claim against a doctor or 
hospital for failure to perform the legal duty to exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence in the treatment of a patient may not also maintain other 
claims against the doctor or hospital for actions that arise from the same 
series of events as the underlying malpractice claim. . . . Kansas courts will 
not permit a plaintiff to “creatively classify” a claim as something other 
than one for medical malpractice if the substance of the claim concerns the 
physician-patient relationship.133 
The Nebraska Supreme Court declared that “any professional misconduct or 
any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or 
fiduciary duties is ‘malpractice’ and comes within the professional or malpractice 
statute of limitations.”134 Similarly, in New Mexico, “it is this affirmative duty of 
full and fair disclosure that is at the heart . . . of fiduciary duty. However, the failure 
of a physician to disclose the factors that might influence a patient in his decision is 
a negligence cause of action that is triable by jury.”135 In Minnesota (one of three 
jurisdictions to broadly reject fiduciary duties for physicians) an appellate court 
determined that such an action might be plausible where the underlying facts are 
independent of medical diagnosis, treatment, and care.136 Ohio, Texas, and 
 
131. Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 83 (2009). 
132. Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978). 
133. Kernke v. Menninger Clinic, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (D. Kan. 2001). 
134. Colton v. Dewey, 321 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Neb. 1982). 
135. Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 223 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). 
136. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171–72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
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Washington courts have similarly wrapped fiduciary duty claims up with malpractice 
claims. In Delaware, fiduciary duties for physicians were rejected altogether because 
the Delaware Supreme Court reserved its courts of chancery for the core 
responsibility of adjudicating disputes involving corporate fiduciaries.137 
Indeed, Anna Laakmann has observed:  
[D]espite frequent incantations of fiduciary principles, courts have 
enforced physicians’ fiduciary duties in a haphazard, ad hoc manner. While 
medical ethical codes and case law routinely pronounce physicians as 
fiduciaries, the legal substance behind this label remains elusive. Courts’ 
vague characterization of physicians’ fiduciary duties offers woefully little 
guidance on the legally permissible bounds of physician behavior under 
conditions of endogenous uncertainty.138 
C. Courts De-Trust the Duty of Care 
The physician’s duty of care, as a fiduciary matter, should ensure that her 
practice matches her level of competence, deficiencies in knowledge or ability, and 
efforts to obtain help when needed. In terms of individual patient care, physicians 
should provide medical care based on objective evidence whenever possible. This 
includes demonstrating a sense of inquiry and taking a scientific approach to solving 
clinical issues for the benefit of the patient.139 
As a historical matter, courts rarely analyzed the duty of care as a function of 
the fiduciary relationship with patients. Rather, courts focused on physician-patient 
disputes as a matter of evidence, with which they were structurally better suited to 
assess. As Mark Hall has surmised, courts have found that “evidence of financial 
incentives would tend to unfairly inflame jurors, and they have resisted efforts to 
craft legal theories based on fiduciary law that would circumvent conventional 
medical malpractice standards.”140 
In claims by patients against physicians, the standard of care must almost 
always be established through expert testimony.141 Expert witnesses typically 
formulate their opinions on the standard of care “by combining their own personal 
experience and knowledge of customary practices with their knowledge of the 
 
137. Mehlman, supra note 68, at 22. 
138. Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36 CARDOZO  
L. REV. 913, 955–56 (2015). 
139. Alfredo D. Espinosa-Brito, Rapid Response: The Clinical Method Is the Scientific Method 
Applied to the Care of a Patient, Response to Doctors Are Not Scientists, BMJ (June 27, 2004), https://
www.bmj.com/rapid-response/2011/10/30/clinical-method-scientific-method-applied-care-patient 
[https://perma.cc/5CRK-WWG3].  
140. Hall, supra note 5, at 493. 
141. Carney-Hayes v. Nw. Wis. Home Care, Inc., 699 N.W. 2d 524, 537 (Wis. 2005). 
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medical literature.”142 Courts have historically given great weight to customary 
practices among physicians.143  
The use of physician custom gave rise to judicially crafted rules that made 
actions challenging physician competence difficult. “Locality” rules, for example, 
required patients to find an expert in the community to testify on their behalf as to 
the applicable standard of care, even though doing so forced even sympathetic 
physicians to choose between their local reputation (a core objective of the fiduciary 
relationship) and testifying on behalf of injured patients.144 In Small v. Howard, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that the defendant-surgeon “was 
bound to possess that skill only which physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability 
and skill, practi[cing] in similar localities.”145 Many states adopted and expanded this 
rule. Expert testimony by physicians who were not familiar with the local practices 
were inadmissible.146 Finding an expert within the defendant’s community was rare 
as many physicians refused to testify, thus leaving the plaintiff to outsource to 
“national” witnesses. 147 
Technological advances and persistent “conspiracy of silence” did result in 
some abandonment of locality rules in favor of national standards of care.148 The 
majority of states have now adopted a “national standard of care” based on the 
expansion of healthcare resources and the nationalization of medical school 
curriculum. The national standard of care requires physicians to act with the degree 
of skill and care ordinarily possessed by a reasonable and prudent physician in the 
same medical specialty acting under the same or similar circumstances.149 
Yet the evolution of national standards of care has been gradual, and large 
jurisdictions with national medical schools retain locality rules. “Of 2007, 21 states 
maintained a version of the locality rule and 29 states followed a national 
standard.150 Of the 21 states that followed a version of the locality rule, 3 followed 
a statewide standard, 2 the same-community standard, 11 the same- or  
 
142. Glenn E. Bradford, The “Respectable Minority” Doctrine in Missouri Medical Negligence 
Law, 56 J. MO. BAR 326, 327 (2000); see also Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal 
Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 185, 191 (2004). 
143. Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History and Definitions: The 
Bad and Good News, 12 W. J. EMERGENCY MED. 109, 110 (2011). 
144. John M. Tyson, Comment, Statutory Standard of Care for North Carolina Health Care 
Providers, 1 CAMPBELL L. REV. 111, 115–16 (2012); Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 
YALE L.J. 1320, 1345 (2017) (“The Restatement’s discussion of negligence refers to ‘community’ more 
than a dozen times, always as a source of liability standards. First, the Restatement squarely indicates that 
the duty a defendant owes a plaintiff is contingent on the community in which the dispute takes place.”). 
145. O’Connor, supra note 105, at 118; Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880), overruled by 
Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968). 
146. Walls v. Boyett, 226 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Ark. 1950) (modifying locality rule to include same 
general neighborhood). 
147. Tyson, supra note 144, at 118. 
148. O’Connor, supra note 105, at 120. 
149. See generally Munro v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1989). 
150. Brian K. Cooke, Elizabeth Worsham & Gary M. Reisfield, The Elusive Standard of Care, 
45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 358, 361 (2017).  
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similar-community standard, and 5 the similar-community standard for general 
practitioners and a national standard for specialists.”151  
Even within states following national standards of care, rules of evidence 
regarding scientific support for expert testimony vary significantly. For example, 
even where there is a majority standard, courts permit physicians to enter evidence 
as to a “respectable minority” judgment by a physician.152 The respectable minority 
doctrine allows physicians choice in an alternative medicine approach to treatment 
to not be seen as a deviation from the standard of care.153  
With respect to other sources of evidence, clinical practice guidelines 
originated as a means of improving the quality of care by attempting to create 
uniformity across regional differences in clinical practice, balance overuse and 
underuse of certain medical services, and provide a means for communicating 
outcomes-based and cost-effective clinical practices to physicians.154 Clinical 
practice guidelines are “a systematically developed statement to assist practitioner 
and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical 
circumstances.”155 The introduction of clinical practice guidelines into medical 
malpractice litigation was intended to establish standards of care with more certainty 
and less subjectivity.156  
While the promise of the clinical practice guidelines was probably always 
overestimated because of idiosyncratic patient needs, courts have nevertheless 
turned them into another evidentiary complication, rarely using them to identify a 
physician’s fiduciary duty of care to a patient.157 In many cases where guidelines are 
admitted into evidence, they do not supply a source of conclusive evidence.158 In 
Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, P.C., for example, a physician presented a printed 
table by the American Heart Associations to establish the standard of care for 
interpreting exercise stress tests.159 The court allowed the chart into evidence not to 
determine the standard of care, but because doing so would “organize the expert 
testimony to assist the trier of fact to more easily understand a highly technical 
 
151. Id. 
152. Bradford, supra note 142, at 329. 
153. Joseph H. King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective Standard of Care 
in Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 49, 57 (1999); Hall v. Hillbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871  
(Miss. 1985); McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 607 (S.C. 1995) (quoting jury instruction which 
stated that “[s]uch differences [due] to preference . . . do not amount to malpractice”). 
154. Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 649 (2001). 
155. Taylor, supra note 108, at 278 (quoting INST. OF MED. COMM. TO ADVISE THE  
PUB. HEALTH SERVS. ON CLINIC PRACT. GUIDLINES, CLINICAL PRACTICE  
GUILDELINES: DIRECTION FOR A NEW PROGRAM 1, 38 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr  
eds., 1990)). 
156. Sam A. McConkey, IV, Note, Simplifying the Law in Medical Malpractice: The Use of Practice 
Guidelines as the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 491, 506 (1995). 
157. Taylor, supra note 108, at 281; Mello, supra note 154, at 663–65. 
158. Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, P.C., No. 01-A-01-9702-CV-00069, 1997 WL 536949 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1997); Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 848 N.E.2d 1285 (N.Y. 2006). 
159. Frakes, 1997 WL 536949, at *2. 
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subject.”160 In Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, after a flowchart depicting clinical guidelines was 
submitted, the court admitted it over a hearsay objection on the basis that it 
illustrated the physician’s thought process, rather than as evidence of the standard 
of care—a distinction it acknowledged might not matter to jurors.161  
However, courts have also rejected clinical practice guidelines on the basis of 
hearsay. In Greathouse v. Rhodes, the plaintiff attempted to introduce clinical practice 
guidelines as evidence of the standard of care for the management of unstable 
angina.162 The trial court refused (and the appellate court held it was not an abuse 
of discretion to do so) because the guidelines were hearsay and not used for 
purposes of impeachment.163 As one study concluded, courts have generally not 
relied on clinical practice guidelines, “and when they have, they were  
used conservatively.”164 
The unpredictability of standards of care works haphazardly against both 
patients and physicians.165 Courts have been known to jettison an accepted standard 
and impose their own.166 In Helling v. Carey, a thirty-two-year-old woman suffered 
severe damage to her eye after a physician failed to administer a glaucoma test.167 
The Court ruled for the plaintiff even though the customary standard was for the 
test to be administered to those over forty years old.168 The court applied, in essence, 
the Hand Formula, determining that a low-cost measure with a high probability of 
benefiting patients sufficed to establish the applicable standard of care.169 
D. Implications for Current Proposals 
These structural judicial limitations would almost certainly confront the 
regimes now being advocated by fiduciary proponents. Consider the fiduciary duty 
Buck proposes for medical providers who bill Medicare. Under the regime he 
envisages, Medicare would be able to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
 
160. Id. at *4. 
161. Hinlicky, 848 N.E.2d at 1291. 
162. Greathouse v. Rhodes, 618 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing plaintiff’s 
allegation that defendant failed to properly diagnose and treat an unstable angina that caused a heart 
attack and death), rev’d on other grounds, 636 N.W.2d 138 (Mich. 2001). 
163. Id. at 115. 
164. Douglas S. Ruhl & Gil Siegal, Medical Malpractice Implications of Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, 157 OTOLARYNGOLOGY–HEAD & NECK SURGERY 175, 176 (2017). 
165. Harris v. Groth, 663 P.2d 113, 120 (Wash. 1983) (“Our holding today may be summarized 
as follows. The standard of care against which a health care provider’s conduct is to be measured is that 
of a reasonably prudent practitioner possessing the degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other 
members of the same profession in the state of Washington. The degree of care actually practiced by 
members of the profession is only some evidence of what is reasonably prudent–it is not dispositive.”). 
166. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the 
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000). 
167. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 982 (Wash. 1974); O’Connor, supra note 105, at 123–25. 
168. Helling, 519 P.2d at 985. 
169. See generally The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932); Helling, 
519 P.2d 981. 
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individual providers which would be tailored to their excessive treatments.170 But 
claims that Medicare has been wrongly billed are almost always accompanied by 
claims of common law fraud, payment by mistake, and unjust enrichment, each of 
which the Department of Justice (which represents Medicare in wrongful payment 
cases) must and does bring as an advocate aiming for the best chance for recovery 
for its client. Given that a court may give Medicare effectively the same  
remedy—the amount it was overcharged—through a contract claim determined by 
a jury, it is likely that the fiduciary duty claim Buck proposes, which would require 
court-managed disgorgement or a constructive trust, would be disfavored, despite 
its compelling and urgent rationale. 
Similarly, Evan Criddle’s recommendation for Congress to amend the 
Administrative Procedures Act to incorporate fiduciary principles of 
purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and transparency, and 
to expand judicial review over some aspects of their implementation, may not lead 
to more faithful behavior. In a careful and methodical analysis, Criddle advocates 
loosening (1) the doctrine of nonreviewability, which limits the types of claims that 
may be raised against agency inaction, and (2) the doctrine of standing, which limits 
the types of parties who may bring claims based on agency inaction.171 He also 
advocates inclusion of White House communications as part of the reviewable 
record judges may consider.172 But as Criddle himself acknowledges, his proposals 
multiply the grounds upon which courts may reach “arbitrary and capricious” 
conclusions.173 As David Zaring has persuasively argued about judicial review of 
agency action generally, “courts do not, in the end, discern the differences among 
these various [agency review] doctrines, frequently do not distinguish among the 
doctrines in application, and probably do not really care which standard of review 
they apply most of the time.”174 
Ethan Leib advocates the adoption of principles to guide a judicial finding of 
“friendship” with accompanying rules as to the screening of minor conflicts, 
threshold presumptions, and limitations on remedies like disgorgement.175 Yet as 
with fiduciary duties for Medicare providers and agency rule-makers, the hope that 
expansion of judicial review will strengthen rather than weaken the fiduciary duties 
is in doubt. Indeed, Leib’s argument focuses on friendships that involve routine 
legal disputes over business opportunities, gifts, and property. Remedies for 
breaches of fiduciary duty are often equitable—by their nature judges seek to avoid 
applying them if adequate alternative legal remedies exist.176  
 
170. Buck, supra note 1, at 1074–75.  
171. Criddle, supra note 1, at 483. 
172. Id. at 484–85. 
173. Id. at 486. 
174. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 138 (2010). 
175. Leib, supra note 1. 
176. DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES & MATERIALS 346 (8th 
ed. 2011) (“There is constant pressure to utilize the remedies test for the parties’ right to a jury trial. 
That test is more practical and easier to apply.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The 
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IV. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST 
As detailed above, much of the literature on expanding fiduciary obligations 
depends on utopian accounts of fiduciary heroes whose conduct is monitored by 
equally utopian judges.177 But in actual operation, the fiduciary construct is not only 
costly, it may overemphasize the conduct of the fiduciary actor and underemphasize 
the context in which a purported breach occurs. In other words, instead of blaming 
a fiduciary for a conflict of interest, it may be more efficient to target the source of 
the conflict. The practice of medicine, like the practice of law, or the management 
of a corporation, as well as parenthood and friendship, occurs in a complex social 
marketplace.178 Studying the resource constraints that physicians face in modern 
practice, the AMA contextualized the physician’s fiduciary duty: 
Physicians’ primary ethical obligation is to promote the well-being of 
individual patients. Physicians also have a long-recognized obligation to 
patients in general to promote public health and access to care. This 
obligation requires physicians to be prudent stewards of the shared societal 
resources with which they are entrusted. Managing health care resources 
responsibly for the benefit of all patients is compatible with physicians’ 
primary obligation to serve the interests of individual 
patients . . . . Arguments that physicians should never allow considerations 
other than the welfare of the patient before them to influence their 
professional recommendations and treatment do not mesh with the reality 
of clinical practice. Physicians regularly work with a variety of limits on 
care: clinical practice guidelines, patient preferences, availability of certain 
services, the benefits covered by a patient’s insurance plan, and the time 
physicians and nurses can spend caring for a patient all influence what 
interventions physicians recommend and what care they provide.179 
Given the complex universe in which fiduciary duties are actually applied, 
broadly worded and executed duties are less, not more, likely to lead to clear 
expectations by fiduciaries or entrustors. 
 
Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1368 (1985); James 
Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 85–86 (2007); Doug Rendleman, Measurement of  
Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 973 (2011). 
177. Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1039 
(2009) (“By obscuring judges’ physicality . . . robes promote the public’s image of judges as a select class 
of people blessed with an almost superhuman capacity to deduce case-specific answers from the 
nation’s fundamental legal precepts.”). 
178. F. Patrick Maloney, The Industrialization of Medicine, 24 PHYSICIAN EXEC. 34 (1998); 
Joanne Reeve, Tom Blakeman, George K. Freeman, Larry A. Green, Paul A. James, Peter Lucassen, 
Carmel M. Martin, Joachim P. Sturmberg & Chris van Weel, Generalist Solutions to Complex  
Problems: Generating Practice-Based Evidence - The Example of Managing Multi-Morbidity, 14 BMC  
FAM. PRAC. 112 (2013). 
179. DOUGLAS, supra note 14, at 2, 5. 
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Physician conflicts of interest in federal and state law demonstrate how little 
was obtained through judicially enforced fiduciary duties.180 Rather, the costs of 
healthcare, the financial integrity of publicly funded healthcare systems, and the 
statutory and regulatory targeting of sources of conflicts of interest—pharmaceutical 
firms, self-referrals, device manufacturers—allowed legislators to shape the practice 
of medicine in ways that achieved most if not all of the aims of fiduciary duties 
without the structural and resource barriers courts face. 
A. Prohibited Conflicts of Interest  
The core fiduciary obligation—that of loyalty—generally admonishes 
fiduciaries to put the interests of their entrustors above their own. The duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest is then another aspect of the physician’s fiduciary duties, such 
as avoiding conflicts “between their commitment to heal patients and their 
economic self-interest.”181 Rodwin has defined conflict of interest as “[a]nything 
that compromises the fiduciary’s loyalty to the fiducie or the fiduciary’s exercise of 
independent judgment on the fiducie’s behalf,” and has identified two main kinds 
of conflicts: “(1) conflicts stemming from financial and other personal interests; and 
(2) conflicts stemming from divided loyalties of an actor performing  
competing roles.”182  
However, if a conflict does arise, that does not automatically disqualify the 
fiduciary from acting in his or her role.183 Under this principle, fiduciaries are not 
necessarily prohibited from entering into transactions that are or appear conflicted; 
in many cases, they may still take advantage of opportunities as long as they disclose 
their interest to their entrustors.184 Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim write that 
there “are reasons to doubt whether conflicts of interest impact the behaviors of 
physicians” because of professional codes of conduct and the norms of  
evidence-based medicine.185 In the corporate context, directors may, by way of 
 
180. See supra Section III and accompanying footnotes. 
181. Karine Morin, Herbert Rakatansky, Frank A. Riddick, Jr., Leonard J. Morse, John  
M. O’Bannnon III, Michael S. Goldrich, Priscilla Ray, Matthew Weiss, Robert M. Sade & Monique  
A. Spillman, Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 80 (2002). 
182. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 244. 
183. Boyd, supra 63, at 137; see also Incentives to Physicians: Wise Policy or Risky Temptation?, 
RELIAS MEDIA (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.reliasmedia.com/articles/8327-incentives-to-physicians-
wise-policy-or-risky-temptation [https://perma.cc/XSU3-3FDW] (“Under no circumstances may 
physicians place their own financial interests above the welfare of their patients . . . . If a conflict 
develops between the physician’s financial interest and the physician’s responsibilities to the patient, 
the conflict must be resolved to the patient’s benefit.” (citations omitted)).  
184. Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Government 
and Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (2011); Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections 
on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United 
States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1452–53 (2010). 
185. Robertson et al., supra note 77, at 452. 
First to Printer_Halabi.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/30/20  11:15 AM 
462 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:433 
comparison, take advantage of opportunities that might belong to the corporation 
after proper disclosure and approval by other directors.186  
Physicians operate under similar fiduciary obligations. A prescribed drug or 
therapy may be provided by a firm that has paid a physician to speak or consult or 
might be delivered in a facility in which the physician has a financial stake.187 In 
some circumstances, disclosure may provide an adequate safeguard for the patient’s 
interests.188 In others, the transaction may pose such a significant risk to patient 
welfare that that they are prohibited entirely.189 As detailed above, courts enforcing 
physicians’ fiduciary duties with respect to these conflicts tended to conflate duties 
of loyalty and candor with routine medical malpractice actions. Fiduciary duties 
themselves played a negligible role in patient protection. As Marc Rodwin famously 
quipped, “although doctors perform fiduciary-like roles and hold themselves out as 
fiduciaries in their ethical codes, the law holds doctors accountable as fiduciaries 
only in restricted situations.”190  
State and federal legislators, on the other hand, have regulated physician 
conflicts of interest in multifaceted and nuanced ways. Under some regulatory 
schemes, physicians are regulated directly—they are prohibited from entering into 
certain transactions that pose risks for patient primacy, allowed to enter into those 
transactions if they meet constraining criteria, or mandated to disclose potential 
conflicts.191 Under other regulatory schemes, it is the sources of financial  
conflicts—pharmaceutical and medical device firms, for example—that are 
 
186. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–.63, 8.70 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); FRANKLIN 
A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 382–407 (2d ed. 2010). 
187. Moe Litman, Self-Referral and Kickbacks: Fiduciary Law and the Regulation of Trafficking 
in Patients, 170 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1119 (2004); Sujit Choudhry, Niteesh K. Choudhry  
& Adalsteinn D. Brown, Unregulated Private Markets for Health Care in Canada? Rules of Professional 
Misconduct, Physician Kickbacks and Physician Self-referral, 170 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1115, 1115 
(2004) (“The term kickback refers to the financial compensation of physicians for patient referrals. 
Compensation can flow from IHFs to referring physicians, or from specialists to primary care 
physicians (fee-splitting). Compensation can consist of cash payments for each referral, discounted 
office space or leases for medical equipment, or business loans at below-market rates. Compensation 
for referrals is unobjectionable in most markets, but is problematic in health care in view of the potential 
conflict between physicians’ financial self-interest and their duty to advise patients solely on the basis 
of health needs.”). 
188. Robert Steinbrook, Online Disclosure of Physician-Industry Relationships, 360 NEW  
ENG. J. MED. 325, 325–27 (2009). 
189. MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE 
UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND JAPAN 209 (2011). 
190. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 242; Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy 
in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 n.109 (2008) (“Marc Rodwin has argued that the concept of doctors 
as fiduciaries for their patients is ‘a dominant metaphor’ in health law, but that courts enforce it in only 
limited circumstances.”). 
191. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 456.054(2) (2020) (establishing that it is a violation of a state criminal 
statute for a “health care provider” to “offer, pay, solicit, or receive a kickback, directly or indirectly, 
overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, for referring or soliciting patients”). 
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targeted.192 Below we detail legal and regulatory regimes that more effectively 
address physician conflicts of interest. 
1. Anti-Kickback Statutes 
In 1972, Congress adopted the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, imposing 
criminal penalties for exchanging (or offering to exchange) anything of value, in an 
effort to induce (or reward) the referral of healthcare products or services 
reimbursed by federal health programs like Medicaid and Medicare.193 The  
Anti-Kickback Statute is broadly drafted and establishes penalties for individuals 
and entities on both sides of prohibited transactions so that both physicians and 
those who would attempt to induce them to prescribe drugs or treatment are 
covered. The statute is also cognizant that medical practice occurs in a complex 
environment so that certain types of payments are excluded from consideration by 
statute.194 Congress further gave HHS the authority to create more safe harbors and 
authorized the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to issue binding advisory 
opinions, which function like case-by-case safe harbors.195 Together, these safe 
harbors protect specifically identified business and financial practices from criminal 
and civil prosecution including space rental, equipment rental, personal services and 
management contracts, health maintenance organizations, preferred provider 
organizations, and sales of medical practices.196 Congress was explicit in its effort to 
codify existing professional ethical canons regarding physician loyalty.197 
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute encouraged states to adopt laws tailored for 
medical practice within their jurisdiction. While Minnesota’s Anti-Kickback Statute 
provides that its rules must be “compatible with, and no less restrictive than” the 
federal Anti-Kickback Statute, New Mexico’s Anti-Kickback Statute reaches 
 
192. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 402–403 (2019). The government has good reasons for doing so. 
Healthcare-related fraud, almost all of which is white-collar crime or civil fraud, costs the government 
billions of dollars. Mihailis E. Diamantis, White-Collar Showdown, 103 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 320,  
320–21 (2017) (“The FBI estimates that the annual cost of white-collar crime in the United States is 
around half a trillion dollars, roughly thirty times the cost for every other crime combined.”). 
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b. 
194. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3). 
195. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936, 2000–02. 
196. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2019); David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market 
Change, Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 534–35 (2001). 
197. The legislative report accompanying the enactment of the statute states that the purpose 
of the statute was to:  
[P]rovide penalties for certain practices which have long been regarded by professional 
organizations as unethical, as well as unlawful in some jurisdictions, and which contribute 
appreciably to the cost of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Thus . . . the criminal 
penalty provision would include such practices as the soliciting, offering or accepting of 
kickbacks or bribes . . . involving providers of health care services.  
H.R. REP. NO. 92-231, at 1 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093. It was understood at 
the time (and thereafter) that although the legislative history and the statute itself spoke in broader 
terms, the overriding purpose of the statute was to “ensure that medical decisions are not influenced 
by financial rewards from third parties.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-276, pt. 1, at 497 (1995). 
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further, “providing that any person who knowingly solicits, receives, offers, or pays 
remuneration directly, indirectly, overtly, covertly, in return for referrals or 
purchasing, leasing, ordering or arranging goods, facilities, or services for which 
payment is made in whole or in part with public money shall be guilty of a felony.”198 
“The state statute does not apply to properly disclosed discounts or to a bona fide 
employee-employer relationship.”199 States have tailored their anti-kickback statutes 
for the unique aspects of medical practice in their territories.200 For example, state 
anti-kickback laws usually apply to all payers while the federal law applies only to 
federal healthcare program payments. 
2. Stark Laws 
As more patients became Medicare eligible after 1965, Congress adopted the 
Ethics in Patient Referral Act of 1989 (Stark Law), which prohibited physicians, or 
their immediate family members, who had a financial relationship with the 
providers of designated health services entities from referring Medicare patients to 
those entities.201 Physicians with interests in companies that provided clinical 
laboratory services, physical therapy services, occupational therapy services, 
outpatient speech-language pathology services, radiology and certain other imaging 
services, radiation therapy services and supplies, and durable medical equipment 
and supplies were prohibited from referring patients to those companies.202 Revised 
in 2008 and again under the Affordable Care Act, Stark “greatly limit[s] a physician’s 
ability to hold financial interests in [providers that create conflicts of interest].”203 
Financial interests under the law include ownership and investment interests, as well 
as compensation arrangements.204 
The Stark Law is not only tailored to specific services where physician 
conflicts are common, but also makes physicians referring to conflicted entities 
strictly liable.205 Disclosure may not cure the conflict (although it may reduce the 
penalty) and it is irrelevant whether a physician intended to refer a patient for 
 
198. Kathryn Leaman, State Anti-Kickback Statutes: Where the Action Is, 2 HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
BRIEF 22, 23 (2008). 
199. Id. 
200. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
LAWS AGAINST HEALTH CARE FRAUD RESOURCE GUIDE (2014), http://www.healthsmartmso.com/
downloadfile/FWA/Care1stFWA/11%20-%20FWA-Law%20Against%20Health%20Care%20Fraud.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4HZB-QNH2].  
201. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 114TH CONG., WHY STARK, WHY NOW? SUGGESTIONS TO 
IMPROVE THE STARK LAW TO ENCOURAGE INNOVATIVE PAYMENTS MODELS 4 (2016), https://
www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stark%20White%20Paper,%20SFC%20Majority%20Staff.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RW4K-YWY8]. 
202. Physician Self-Referral, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/ [https://perma.cc/EHE8-
V5CJ ] (Jan. 5, 2015, 5:59 AM). 
203. Matt Frederiksen & Emily Egan Weaver, Understanding the Federal Physician Self-Referral 
Statute: “Stark Law,” 17 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 47, 48 (2015). 
204. 42 C.F.R. § 411.354 (2019). 
205. Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 15 (2011). 
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financial gain or not.206 Congress’s purpose in enacting the Stark Law was to “limit 
the influence of financial relationships on physician referrals.”207 Congress’s 
intention was to create a “bright line rule, which would encourage hospitals and 
other providers to self-police their arrangements with physicians.”208  
As with the Anti-Kickback Statute, Congress gave HHS “the authority to 
except certain relationships from the general referral prohibition.”209 With that 
authority, HHS established through regulations exceptions to ensure that the 
referral prohibition of the Stark Law “was not overly broad.”210 For example, 
physicians may consult with one another about the best treatment options for a 
patient and evade violation of the law as long as the “‘request and need for the 
consultation are documented in the patient’s medical record . . . . After the 
consultation is provided,’ the [referred physician] must prepare ‘a written report of 
his or her findings, which is provided to the physician who requested the 
consultation.’”211 The referred physician “must communicate ‘with the referring 
physician on a regular basis about the patient’s course of treatment  
and progress.’”212  
Congress shaped judicial management of physician conflicts under Stark by 
authorizing a burden shifting framework under which the physician would be 
presumed to have violated the prohibition on self-referrals but could raise an 
exception as an affirmative defense. Those exceptions include referrals within the 
same group practice, office space, equipment, bona fide employment relationships, 
and several exceptions for physician recruitment and compensation 
arrangements.213 “[M]any of the exceptions require that the arrangement be (1) in 
writing, (2) signed by the parties, (3) commercially reasonable without regard to 
referrals, and (4) fair market value.”214 The Affordable Care Act also gave the HHS 
the authority to “decrease the penalty of the Stark Law violation if the violation has 
been self-disclosed.”215 
As with the Anti-Kickback Statute, states have adopted their own versions of 
self-referral prohibitions.216 Thirty-four states have laws regarding referrals by 
healthcare providers to entities in which they have a financial interest (e.g., a 
 
206.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 201, at 2, 5, 6. 
207. Id. at 2. 
208. Id. at 5. 
209. Stacey A. Tovino, Gone Too Far: Federal Regulation of Health Care Attorneys, 91  
OR. L. REV. 813, 863 (2013). 
210. Id. 
211. United States ex rel. Barker v. Tidwell, No. 4:12-CV-108 (CDL), 2015 WL 3505554, at *4 
(M.D. Ga. June 3, 2015) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2019)). 
212. Id. 
213. Rick Rifenbark, Paul A. Gomez, Travis Jackson & Ryan M. McAteer, What You Don’t 
Know Can Hurt You: Best Practices and Key Legal Issues in Health Care Due Diligence, 19 J. HEALTH 
CARE COMPLIANCE 15, 19 (2017). 
214. Id. 
215. Frederiksen & Weaver, supra note 203, at 64. 
216. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 650.01–.02 (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.098 (2020). 
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physician referring a patient to a surgical center in which he or she is an investor).217 
Some state laws mirror federal law. Others prohibit all self-referrals and ban 
physicians from any ownership interest in hospitals or other facilities to which they 
refer patients. Several simply require disclosure of financial interests to patients. 
Most states also prohibit fee splitting or giving rebates for referrals, which might 
also apply to some transactions between referral sources. For example, many states’ 
laws prohibit paying or accepting payment from others to refer claimants to 
healthcare providers, or to provide services to a person knowing that the person has 
been referred in exchange for payment of a fee.218 
The rationale behind these state statutes “regarding a physician’s receiving 
compensation for the referral of patients or the prescription of drugs is to protect 
consumers from economic arrangements in the medical disciplines that will increase 
the cost of health care, restrict the patient’s access to medical goods and services, 
or otherwise harm patients as consumers.”219 Indeed, regulations of physician 
referrals overlap with the physician’s duty of loyalty and candor to patients.220 State 
legislatures have “accepted the rationale that patients should receive their medical 
opinions about their own treatment, and about referrals to other physicians or 
specialists, that are not the product of a conflict of interest on the part of the 
referring physician.”221 These statutes all relate to the physician’s obligation to 
provide patient care free from conflicts of interest and to fully inform patients about 
the care they receive.222 
3. Anti-Detailing Laws 
In addition to Congress and state legislatures adopting measures to address 
physician conflicts of interest including prohibitions, safe harbors, and disclosures, 
state legislatures have also attempted to address specific sources of conflicts like 
incentives extended by drug and device firms. Prescription drug marketing is a large 
part of the success of the pharmaceutical industry, which grossed over $800 billion 
in 2011.223 Eighty percent of marketing efforts to influence physicians are through 
industry gifts and detailing, the activity of pharmaceutical sales representatives (reps) 
when they make calls to physicians and provide them with “details”—scientific 
 
217. ASTRO, STATE SELF-REFERRAL LAW CITATIONS, https://www.astro.org/
uploadedfiles/content/advocacy/state%20self-referral%20laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/N249-
EWKU] ( last visited Nov. 7, 2020). 
218. IDAHO CODE § 41-348 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 456.054 (2020). 
219. 61 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 245 § 8 (2018). 
220. Compare Julie E. Kass & John S. Linehan, Fostering Healthcare Reform Through a Bifurcated 
Model of Fraud and Abuse Regulation, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCIS. L. 75, 97 (2012), with Greg Radinsky, 
Defining a Group Practice: An Analysis of the Stark I Final Rule, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1122 (1997). 
221. 61 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 219. 
222. Id. 
223. Melissa N. Hoffman, Pharmaceutical Detailing Is Not for Everyone: Side Effects May Include 
Sub-Optimal Prescribing Decisions, Compromised Patient Health, and Increased Prescription Drug Spending, 
33 J. LEGAL MED. 381, 382 (2012). 
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information, benefits, side effects, or adverse events—related to a drug.224 Detailing 
activity includes both innocuous gifts like free samples for patients as well as 
inducements for physicians themselves.  
Detailing is partnered with data mining—understanding how and why 
physicians prescribe the drugs they do then adopting a range of tactics to encourage 
them to prescribe more of a certain, inevitably more expensive, drug.225 Data mining 
involves large third-party firms that assemble information about physicians’ 
prescribing practices and sell it to drug companies for marketing and sales 
purposes.226 The data gathered includes the physician’s name and address; the 
patient’s gender and age; the name, dosage and quantity of the medication; and the 
date and location where the prescription was filled.227  
Detailing is a “massive and expensive” venture for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, with the sole purpose of marketing brand-name drugs.228 “On 
average, 28 detailers visit a single prescriber in a week, and 14 detailers contact a 
single specialist each week.”229 Firms spend an average of $8,290 per physician.230 
Studies have shown visiting physicians increases drugs sales, and even small gifts or 
free samples have been shown to have an effect.231 Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
provide more than $15 billion worth of free samples to ninety percent  
of U.S. physicians each year.232 
The adverse effects on physicians and patients are well established. Physicians’ 
prescribing behavior may be compromised. Detailers try to promote their drug for 
use in the widest population of patients without any thought to the specific patient 
at the moment’s well-being.233 “If they see that I’m prescribing more of Drug X 
than their Drug Y, they might show me their data that points to the problems of 
 
224. David Grande, Limiting the Influence of Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts on  
Physicians: Self-Regulation or Government Intervention?, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 79, 79 (2009). 
225. Hoffman, supra note 223. 
226. JOHN KASPRAK, FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT DECISION –– NEW HAMPSHIRE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG INFORMATION LAW (2008), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-r-
0680.htm [https://perma.cc/AKD3-G76Y]. 
227. Hoffman, supra note 223. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 383. 
231. Richard Saver, Deciphering the Sunshine Act: Transparency Regulation and Financial Conflicts 
in Health Care, 43 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 315 (2017). 
232. Hoffman, supra note 223, at 389. 
233. See id. at 341. 
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Drug X.”234 The patient may receive care affected by detailers’ representations, 
rather than individual needs, potentially causing adverse outcomes.235  
As early as 1991, the AMA issued ethical guidelines that allowed gifts less than 
$100, if they primarily entailed a benefit to patients.236 The Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the industry’s main lobby, followed with 
voluntary guidelines, similar to AMA’s, to declare its commitment “to ensure their 
medicines are marketed in a manner that benefits patients and enhances the practice 
of medicine.”237 The AMA also created the Physician Data Restriction Program 
(PDRP) allowing physicians to protect their individual prescribing data from 
detailers while still being available for medical research.238  
Several states, encouraged by their physicians, viewed pharmaceutical detailing 
as a threat to the integrity of their practices and to patient welfare. In 2006, New 
Hampshire adopted the Prescription Information Confidentiality Act which 
declared that prescription information shall not be “used, transferred, licensed, or 
sold for any commercial purpose except for limited purposes.”239 Specifically, it 
served to safeguard the privacy of both patients and physicians by preventing the 
sale of prescription information for use by pharmacies and drug companies to 
promote specific medications or monitor sales.240 The Prescription Information 
Confidentiality Act was carefully drafted to not interfere with legitimate use of 
identifiable data (e.g., utilization review, compliance, academic research, or 
insurance company reimbursement to pharmacies).241  
Vermont adopted a similar measure in an effort to promote “physician 
confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-patient 
relationship.”242 Vermont had three objectives with this law: (1) avoiding harm to 
 
234. Hearing on H.B. 1346 Before the House Comm. on Exec. Dep’ts & Admin., 159th Gen. Ct., 
2006 Sess. (N.H. 2006) (statement of Dr. Marc Sadowsky, President of N.H. Medical Soc’y); see also 
Memorandum or Amicus Curiae Coalition for Healthcare Communications in Support of Plaintiff’s 
Prayer for Permanent Injunction at 16, IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008)  
(No. 06-280-PB) (citing and quoting Dr. Sadowsky’s testimony on H.B. 1346).  
235. Hoffman, supra note 223, at 386; Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The 
Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012). 
236. See Hoffman, supra note 223, at 388; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 9: Ethics of 
Professional Self-Regulation, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 9.6.2.  
237.  Grande, supra note 224, at 79; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 9: Ethics of Professional  
Self-Regulation, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 9.6.2; PhRMA, CODE ON 
INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS (2009), https://www.phrma.org/-/media/
Project/PhRMA/PhRMA-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/A-C/Code-of-Interaction_FINAL21.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WJ4N-9ZSX]. 
238. Hoffman, supra note 223, at 391; see also Douglas S. Kaplan & Wayne H. Fujita,  
Am. Med. Ass’n, Physicians Discuss Use of Prescribing Data, 105 W. VA. MED. J. 52 (2011). 
239. N.H. REV. STAT. § 318:47(f) (2006). 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011); see S. 115, 2007–2008 Leg.,  
Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2008).  
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public health, (2) controlling costs, and (3) protecting physician’s privacy.243 The law 
aimed to give physicians control over how information about prescribing practices 
could be used with respect to marketing through its “opt-in” provision.244 
Vermont’s law barred the use of data unless a physician “opts-in.”245  
Third-party data miners brought suit against both laws, arguing that they 
represented viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.246 The 
First Circuit upheld New Hampshire’s law while the Second Circuit invalidated 
Vermont’s.247 The Second Circuit determined that Vermont’s law constituted an 
“unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech.”248 In 2011, Vermont appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.249 In a 6-3 vote, the 
Court held in IMS v. Sorrell that a statute prohibiting the sale of  
prescriber-identifying information is unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.250 The Supreme Court was relatively indifferent to the fiduciary 
relationship between physicians and patients adversely affected by the measures 
adopted by New Hampshire and Vermont. In the Court’s view, the damage to the 
relationship was a “necessary cost of freedom” for the data miners.251 
B. Candor and Disclosure 
While anti-detailing laws failed, states achieved greater success using 
mechanisms of transparency to reveal industry tactics that created conflicts of 
interest for physicians.252 State legislatures led in the regulation of the content of 
 
243. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of Prescribing Data for Drug 
Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248 (2011).  
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 1249; see IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Vt. 2009), rev’d, 630 F.3d 
263 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d. 564 U.S. 552; IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
557 U.S. 936 (2009), and abrogated by Sorrell, 564 U.S. 552; IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 
163 (D.N.H. 2007) (holding the statute was subject to the First Amendment, prescription information 
was commercial speech, and the statute did not advance the state’s interest in promoting public health), 
rev’d in part and vacated in part, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Kasprak, supra note 226. 
247. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42; see also Stephanie Saul, Federal Court Upholds Drug Privacy Law,  
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/business/19drug.html 
[https://perma.cc/U8VC-MD9Z].  
248. Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 282; see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (providing that the test requires the government show that regulations restricting 
commercial speech meet two requirements: (1) the regulation serves a substantial state interest, and (2) 
the governmental interest could not be adequately served by a more limited expression on the 
commercial speech). 
249. Sorrell, 564 U.S. 552; see also Robert Corn-Revere & Ronald G. London, Supreme Court 
Invalidates Vermont Law Limiting Data Mining for Pharmaceutical “Detailing,” DAVIS 
WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP  (June 23, 2011), https://www.dwt.com/advisories/Supreme_Court_ 
Invalidates_Vermont_Law_Limiting_Data_Mining_for_Pharmaceutical_Detailing_06_23_2011/ 
[https://perma.cc/3EG2-HDNA]. 
250. Corn-Revere & Ronald G. London, supra note 249.  
251. Piety, supra note 235, at 1. 
252. JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40790, REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF GIFTS 
AND PAYMENTS TO HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2009).  
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physician disclosures to patients, although Congress followed with the Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act in 2010. 
1. Conflicts of Interest 
Before the Physician Payments Sunshine Act was adopted as part of the 
Affordable Care Act in 2010, California, the District of Columbia, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Vermont, and West Virginia had adopted laws requiring 
disclosure of pharmaceutical firm and medical device companies’ payments to 
physicians for a range of activities including consulting, speaking, and leading 
continuing medical education seminars, in addition to outright gifts.253 
Dr. Peter Lurie, deputy director of Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, 
outlined the effects of these practices: 
Physicians typically claim that they are unaffected by such interactions 
(although they are willing to acknowledge that their colleagues might be 
influenced). But pharmaceutical companies would not be catering to the 
culinary and travel preferences of physicians if they thought their efforts 
were for nought. The evidence strongly suggests that the companies are 
right. For instance, contact with pharmaceutical company representatives 
is associated with changes in the prescribing practices of residents and 
physicians and more rapid adoption of new drugs by prescribers. 
Sponsorship of continuing medical education programs by a 
pharmaceutical company and all-expenses-paid travel to conferences are 
associated with increases in the prescribing rate of the sponsors’ drugs. 
Finally, interactions with a pharmaceutical company representative are 
associated with an increased likelihood of requesting that the 
representative’s company’s drug be added to the hospital formulary. Thus, 
as companies with a clear conflict of interest in promoting a specific 
product continue to influence physicians, the result can be prescribing 
based on marketing, rather than science.254 
A report from the Institute of Medicine found that the drug company practice 
of giving doctors gifts and meals, along with other financial incentives, may 
influence physicians to prescribe a specific drug when another drug might be more 
beneficial to the patient.255 The American Medical Association acknowledged these 
 
253. Joseph S. Ross, Josh E. Lackner, Peter Lurie, Cary P. Gross, Sidney Wolfe & Harlan  
M. Krumholz, Pharmaceutical Company Payments to Physicians: Early Experiences with Disclosure Laws 
in Vermont and Minnesota, 297 JAMA 1216, 1216–17 (2007). 
254. Paid to Prescribe? Exploring the Relationship Between Doctors and the Drug Industry: Hearing 
Before the Special S. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 23–24 (2007) (statement of Dr. Peter Lurie, Deputy 
Director, Public Citizen’s Health Research Group).  
255. Chris Hendel, Vermont Passes Sunshine Law Limiting Drug Company Gifts to Doctors, 
CONSUMER REPS. (June 10, 2009, 5:11 PM), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2009/06/
vermont-passes-sunshine-law-limiting-drug-company-gifts-to-doctors/index.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
B26U-P37Q]. 
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risks to the duties physicians owed to patients.256 The AMA advised physicians that 
only small gifts and “modest meals” might be allowed and, even then, must “entail 
a benefit to patients,” not be “of substantial value,” or must “serve a genuine 
educational function” to be permitted.257 Even those small promotional items, 
however, had been shown to affect physician behavior.258 
a. State Disclosure Laws 
In 1993, Minnesota adopted the country’s first physician payment sunshine 
law.259 It not only banned gifts to practitioners, it required that firms report 
payments and other compensation paid to practitioners under the law.260 In 2004, 
California introduced SB 1765 “to place limits on promotional gifts pharmaceutical 
companies may give to physicians and other health care professionals that are 
consistent with established guidelines,” out of concern that the gifts were affecting 
“both the utilization and types of drugs prescribed.”261 The bill was specifically 
aimed at easing public concerns about conflicts of interest between doctors and 
drug company sales representatives.262 The bill required pharmaceutical companies 
to comply with PhRMA and OIG guidelines, set limits on giving gifts to medical or 
healthcare professionals, except for drug samples, educational materials, and related 
materials, and mandated that the companies develop and maintain a policy that 
complies with these guidelines.263 Lawmakers noted the ineffectiveness of voluntary 
guidelines on their own as too “permissive” and “a number of troublesome 
practices became commonplace after the guidelines were adopted.”264 The 
legislation attempted to remedy the situation by enforcing the guidelines on a 
governmental level, where failure to comply could result in civil enforcement action 
or prosecutors could “file complaints seeking injunctive relief and restitution” and 
“could also seek civil penalties.”265  
 
256. Marketing and Advertising of Pharmaceuticals, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES  
(Nov. 5, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/marketing-and-advertising-of-pharmaceuticals.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/95RA-R58N]; AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 8: Ethics for Physicians & the Health of the 
Community, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 8.061. 
257. AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 9: Ethics of Professional Self-Regulation, in CODE OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 9.6.2. 
258. David Grande, Dominick L. Frosch, Andrew W. Perkins & Barbara E. Kahn, Effect of 
Exposure to Small Pharmaceutical Promotional Items on Treatment Preferences, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 887 (2009), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/773513 
[https://perma.cc/7G65-LX6H]. 
259. MINN. STAT. § 151.461 (2020); id. § 151.252, subdiv. 3 (2019). 
260. § 151.252, subdiv. 3. 
261. S. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S. 1765, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., 
at 4 (Cal. 2004). 
262. Id. at 3. 
263. Id. at 1. 
264. Id. at 3–4. 
265. Id. at 7. 
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Even after SB 1765, California physicians and medical professionals led the 
nation in the number of gifts taken, over $1.4 billion in 2014.266 SB 790, an update 
to the law, aims to curb financial payments, gifts, and incentives to physicians. 
Massachusetts adopted a similar strategy through its Pharmaceutical and Medical 
Device Manufacturer Code of Conduct, which incorporated the requirements from 
two medical trade associations’ codes, PhRMA and AdvaMed; however, the state’s 
code also included several of its own requirements and prohibitions that were not 
later preempted by federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act.267  
Vermont adopted one of the first laws requiring payment disclosure from the 
medical industry to physicians and research hospitals or universities.268 The state’s 
law revealed that “[t]he median payment [to a physician] was $177, and the largest 
payment was $20,000. Sixty-eight percent of these payments were in the form of 
food, which clearly provides no patient benefit and, therefore, in our view, is likely 
to violate the AMA and the PhRMA guidelines.”269 
After adoption of the federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act as part of the 
Affordable Care Act, detailed below, many states have adopted laws that extend 
disclosure requirements to medical providers not covered like physician assistants 
and nurse practitioners.270 
b. The Federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act 
Well after Minnesota’s 1993 law, but in parallel with state efforts, Congress 
explored legislative efforts at requiring disclosure of payments by firms to 
physicians.271 The federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act was first introduced as 
a stand-alone bill by Senators Charles “Chuck” Grassley and Herbert “Herb” Kohl 
in 2007.272 After it initially failed to pass, the bill was included in an amended form 
in the Affordable Care Act as section 6002.273 The Act requires that all 
manufacturers of drugs or medical devices that are covered by Medicare, Medicaid, 
or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) report “[p]ayments [and] transfers 
 
266. Geneva Peppars, Senate Passes Bill Restricting Gifts from Pharma Companies to Doctors, 
KRCR (May 18, 2017), https://krcrtv.com/archive/senate-passes-bill-restricting-gifts-from-pharma-
companies-to-doctors [https://web.archive.org/web/20201009022516/https://krcrtv.com/archive/ 
senate-passes-bill-restricting-gifts-from-pharma-companies-to-doctors ]. 
267. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111N, § 6(1) (2012). 
268. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4632 (2019). 
269. Paid to Prescribe? Exploring the Relationship Between Doctors and the Drug Industry: Hearing 
Before the Special S. Comm. on Aging, supra note 254, at 23–24. 
270. Meena Datta, States May Be Moving to Expand the Federal Sunshine Law, LAW 360 ( July 
11, 2014, 10:42 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/550642/print?section=california 
[https://perma.cc/AY2K-WY3J ]. 
271.  Elizabeth Richardson, Health Policy Brief: The Physician Payment Sunshine Act, HEALTH 
AFFS. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=127 
[https://perma.cc/6Q3N-J6TM]; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,  
Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 6002, § 1128G(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
272. See Richardson, supra note 271, at 2.  
273. Id. 
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of value” made to physicians or teaching hospitals that are $100 or more.274 Drug 
samples that are not meant for sale and are distributed to physicians for patients to 
use are excepted from reporting.275 In addition, the Act does not require that the 
doctors or hospitals themselves report such information, but it does permit them 
to contest the data should they feel it is inaccurate.276 All reports must be made in a 
timely manner and must be reported in full or risk fines up to $1,000,000.277  
The Act lists both the types of recipients the companies must report, as well 
as what types of transfers that must be reported. It requires that those gifts be 
reported, along with any other “transfer of value,” which includes “honoraria, 
consulting fees, food, travel, education, research, charitable contribution,” as well 
as investments doctors make in the companies, such as stocks or shares.278 The 
Secretary of Health and Human Services aggregates and posts that information on 
a website available to the public.279 Patients may search the site to see if their 
physicians or hospitals have received transfers of value and in what amount.280  
The Act is aimed at protecting the patient’s right to be informed about their 
healthcare. Conflicts of interest preoccupied Congress in the years leading to 
adoption of the Sunshine Act. Senator Grassley, long concerned about integrity in 
various sectors of the healthcare system, became concerned with the relationship 
between doctors and the pharmaceutical industry after learning that medical 
research was being conducted that was funded by pharmaceutical companies that 
manufactured the drugs being researched.281 Grassley investigated industry activities 
in the research process and discovered a significant lack of disclosure about industry 
ties.282 Contemporaneously, the New York Times reported in a series of articles that 
the largest pharmaceutical companies were paying hundreds of millions of dollars 
through rebates to doctors across the nation every year in return for them 
prescribing certain classes of medications instead of their competitors’ versions.283 
By giving the doctors rebates for the amount of drugs they prescribed, the doctors 
were incentivized to prescribe more expensive drugs in higher doses, sometimes to 
 
274. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1128G(d)(1)(B)(i).  
275. Id. at § 1128G(d)(1)(B)(ii).  
276. Id. at § 1128G(c)(1)(C)(ix). 
277. Id. at § 1128G(b)(2).  
278. Id. at § 1128G(a)(1) (A)(iv).  
279. Id. at § 1128G(c)(1)(C).  
280. Id. at § 1128G(d)(3)(A), (B). 
281. Let the Sunshine In: Implementing the Physician Payments Sunshine Act: Roundtable Before 
the Special S. Comm. on Aging, 112th Cong 1, 2 (2012) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
282. Grassley Q & A: Disclosing Drug Industry Dollars to Doctors, CHUCK GRASSLEY (Sept. 10, 
2011), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-q-disclosing-drug-industry-
dollars-doctors [https://perma.cc/QK8V-G6V8]. 
283. Alex Berenson & Andrew Pollack, Doctors Reap Millions for Anemia Drugs, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/business/09anemia.html [https:// 
perma.cc/L69F-962Z]; Gardiner Harris & Janet Roberts, Doctors’ Ties to Drug Makers Are Put on Close 
View, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 21, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/us/21drug.html 
[https://perma.cc/NHC8-C6DT]. 
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unsafe levels.284 After the Act failed to pass on its own in 2008, it was reintroduced 
by Grassley and Kohl in 2009 as a part of the Affordable Care Act, which passed  
in 2010.285  
The disclosure regime is structured so as to require firms to report payments, 
instead of imposing burdens on physicians. Indeed, the information required to be 
disclosed was already being collected by drug and device firms.286 The law is 
therefore a less burdensome way to get at a source of physician conflicts of interest 
than a duty-of-loyalty inquiry undertaken by a court. 
c. System Effects of Federal and State Sunshine Laws 
Transparency laws have not only benefited patients, who now have access to 
information on sources of payments to physicians, but also law enforcement 
ensuring the healthcare sector’s financial integrity.287 The database is cautious in its 
communications to patients. Shantanu Agrawal, the former deputy administrator 
for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), stated that the 
government would not “draw conclusions about the disclosed payments,” and 
“cautioned” the public not to do so either because “[f]inancial ties and relationships 
between medical manufacturers and health care providers do not necessarily signal 
wrongdoing.”288 In addition, the “Open Payments program does not identify which 
financial relationships are beneficial and which could cause conflicts of interest.”289 
Patients themselves are allowed to draw their own conclusions.290 In one study 
conducted in the medical research context, this comports with patient  
 
284. Berenson & Pollack, supra note 283; 153 CONG. REC. S11,215, S11,217–18 (daily  
ed. Sept. 6, 2007) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
285. Paid to Prescribe? Exploring the Relationship Between Doctors and the Drug Industry: Hearing 
Before the Special S. Comm. on Aging, supra note 254, at 1 (statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl, Chairman 
of the Comm.).  
286. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, U.S. Sen., Grassley, Kohl Say Public Should Know When 
Pharmaceutical Makers Give Money to Doctors (Sept. 6, 2007), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/
news/news-releases/grassley-kohl-say-public-should-know-when-pharmaceutical-makers-give-money 
[https://perma.cc/U3EW-NW5R]. 
287. James Rickert, If Obamacare Is Dismantled, Keep the Sunshine Act to Illuminate Physician 
Conflict of Interest, STAT ( Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/25/sunshine-act-
physicians-conflict-of-interest/ [https://perma.cc/7QZR-H8ZL]. 
288. Peter Frost, Alex Richards, Cynthia Dizikes & Ellen Jean Hirst, Obamacare Sunshine Act 
Sheds Light on $3.5B Paid to Doctors, CHI TRIB. (Oct. 1, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-sunshine-act-1001-biz-20141001-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3K7T-ND7G].  
289. Robert Lowes, Open Payments Data Release Has Big Gaps, MEDSCAPE (Sept. 30, 2014), 
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/832614 [https://perma.cc/QGV5-RBRB]; Jeanne Whalen, 
Joseph Walker & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Payments Reveal Range of Doctors’ Ties with Industry, WALL  
ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/payments-show-range-of-doctors-ties-with-
industry-1412208328 [https://perma.cc/4DG4-S2DN]. 
290. See Open Payments Data in Context, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/About/Open-Payments-Data-in-Context.html [https://perma.cc/ 
A2WG-YZWF] (Nov. 1, 2019, 8:25 AM).  
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interests—they want to know about potential conflicts, even if it might not 
ultimately change their mind about seeing a particular physician.291 
Not only patients, but governmental entities also use the data for purposes of 
ensuring the integrity of the quality and financing of the health system. The 
information has been used to help investigate providers and firms for violating  
anti-kickback statutes.292 Disclosure supports “enforcement of the healthcare fraud 
and abuse laws by identifying financial relationships that may warrant further 
scrutiny for association with problematic referrals or false claims.”293 In 2017, the 
HHS Office of the Inspector General specified that it would “analyze 2015 data 
extracted from the Open Payments website” for purposes of  
commencing investigations.294  
In a class action suit filed against Insys Therapeutics, Inc. in 2014, four months 
after the release of the first Open Payments data, the plaintiffs used Insys’s own 
data against them.295 The plaintiffs alleged that the payments the company made to 
physicians who promoted the company’s drug Subsys through speeches “essentially 
were kickbacks to induce prescriptions.”296 The case was settled in 2015 for $6.1 
million, but the same data was used to launch investigations of improper financial 
incentives by authorities in Oregon, Massachusetts, and four other states, as well as 
the HHS Office of Inspector General.297 On May 14, 2018, the U.S. government 
officially intervened as a plaintiff.298 
Since the adoption of the Act, physicians, hospitals, and healthcare systems 
have altered their relationship with pharmaceutical representatives by either limiting 
their interactions with them or completely denying them access to their offices.299 
 
291. Christine Grady, Elizabeth Horstmann, Jeffrey S. Sussman & Sara Chandros Hull, The 
Limits of Disclosure: What Research Subjects Want to Know About Investigator Financial Interests, 34  
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 592, 594, 596–97 (2006). 
292. Richard S. Saver, Shadows amid Sunshine: Regulating Financial Conflicts in Medical Research, 
145 CHEST 379, 383 (2014). 
293. Id. 
294. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OIG WORK PLAN 
16 (2017), https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/workplan/2017/hhs%20oig%20 
work%20plan%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW6W-SP6W]. 
295. James Swann, Litigation, Risk to Reputation May Come from Scrutiny of Doctors’ Payment 
Data, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.bna.com/litigation-risk-reputation-
n17179895627/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20160910122004/http://www.bna.com/litigation-
risk-reputation-n17179895627/]. 
296. Brian A. Dahl, Mining Open Payments Spend Data, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS  
(Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/mining-open-payments-spend-data-
managing-risk-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/S8FZ-Q74Y]. 
297. Id.  
298. Nate Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Joins Whistleblower Case Against Insys over 




299. Pharmaceutical companies have also reduced the amount of certain types of transfers, as 
payments for honoraria declined by about fifty percent and by more than thirty percent for gifts in 
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A study released by SK&A, a healthcare database, in 2016 suggests that this change 
stems in part directly from the disclosures required by the Act. For instance, the 
“no-access rate” to physicians and hospitals for reps “jumped from 27.8% in 
December 2013 to 36.5% in June 2016.”300 Furthermore, some health systems 
actually cited the Act as the reason for its altered stance on admitting reps, such as 
ThedaCare in Wisconsin, which barred reps from its clinics in 2013 because 
“[p]atients want and deserve complete confidence that their interests are the only 
interests when prescribing decisions are made, and by making this change, we can 
provide that confidence.”301 
Some evidence suggests that the Act may have reduced the number of 
prescriptions all together. After observing that there was a reduction in the overall 
number of branded drugs being prescribed since the Act, a team of researchers at 
the University of Michigan compared three states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and 
New York, post–disclosure law: 
Overall, these results consistently suggest that the disclosure law was 
effective in reducing the total number of prescriptions and possibly in 
driving physicians to substitute away from branded drugs to generics. 
These results are among the first to provide empirical evidence that 
disclosure laws had an impact on physician prescription behavior, both in 
a statistical and economic sense.302 
The results of the researchers’ study revealed that by comparing “physicians’ 
prescriptions with the prescriptions written by physicians in the control group(s),” 
there was a “48-59 percent decrease for name-brand statins, a 46-54 percent 
decrease for branded antidepressants and a 40-45 percent decrease for branded 
antipsychotics.”303 As Professor Manchada, one of the lead researchers, stated, 
“[t]here was a much larger relative decrease in name-brand drug prescriptions, 
 
2015. Thomas Sullivan, Open Payments 2015 Data Released, POL’Y & MED., https://
www.policymed.com/2016/07/open-payments-2015-data-released.html [https://perma.cc/24ET-
G2MY] (May 5, 2018). 
300. Robert Lowes, More Physicians Saying ‘No Drug Reps Allowed,’ MEDSCAPE (Sept. 13, 
2016), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/868748 [https://perma.cc/27HR-9N5S]. 
301. Id.; see also Diana Swift, Industry Incentives May Drive Pricier Anti-VEGF Drug Use, 
MEDSCAPE ( June 23, 2016), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/865279 [https://perma.cc/ 
8BBS-W2ML] (citing a study where industry incentive payments or reimbursements, of even one to 
twenty-five dollars, were linked to a greater likelihood of a physician injecting patients with the payer’s 
drugs, even when the cheaper brand was just as effective). 
302. Tong Guo, S. Sriram & Puneet Manchanda, “Let the Sun Shine In”: The Impact of Industry 
Payment Disclosure on Physician Prescription Behavior 3 (Feb. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=2953399 [https://web.archive.org/web/20180603204010/https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2953399 ].  
303. Id.; Greta Guest, Doctors Write Fewer Prescriptions After Sunshine Laws Reveal Drug 
Company Payments, MICH. NEWS ( June 21, 2017), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/24922-doctors-
write-fewer-prescriptions-after-sunshine-laws-reveal-drug-company-payments [https://perma.cc/ 
CD4W-46NU]. 
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which means some doctors shifted toward generics as a result of the disclosure and 
that fits with the intent of the law.”304  
Even where fiduciary duties have led courts to conclude that physicians should 
disclose financial arrangements, and most have concluded otherwise, the benefit to 
the broader healthcare sector has been limited. Indeed, the nature of judicially 
enforced fiduciary duties works against the broader system effects accomplished by 
the Physician Payments Sunshine Act. As Richard Saver has argued, “[a]s with 
provider quality reporting, the real benefits of financial conflicts transparency more 
likely accrue over the long term and through secondary audiences  
beyond patients.”305 
2. Informed Consent 
a. Federal and State Sunshine Laws 
While the federal law aimed at addressing conflicts of interest in the practice 
of medicine, legislators also believed that disclosure was a material part of the 
informed consent process. As with the Anti-Kickback Statute, Stark laws, and 
equivalent state statutory approaches, transparency laws were based upon ethical 
and legal frameworks designed to enhance and protect patient informed consent 
principles.306 “The Sunshine Act ensures the openness and transparency of the 
financial ties between doctors and the drug and medical device industries. These 
financial relationships are valuable and lead to new therapies and technologies, but 
the public has a right to know about these financial ties.”307 
[T]his legislation does not regulate the business of drug and device 
companies. Let the people in industry do their business since they have the 
training and the skills to get the job done. But keep the American people 
apprised of the business you are doing and how you are doing it. After all, 
what is at risk isn’t merely private interest but the health and well-being of 
all Americans who depend upon the drugs and medical devices to sustain 
and to improve their lives.308 
The purpose of the law was to effectively reach the same result as a fiduciary 
duty of candor, although far more effectively so. “By requiring drug companies and 
medical device manufacturers to report on their gifts to doctors we are empowering 
patients to talk with their doctors about the drugs they are prescribed and to learn 
 
304. Guest, supra note 303.  
305. Saver, supra note 231, at 343. 
306. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 3, 114 (1986). 
307. Let the Sunshine In: Implementing the Physician Payments Sunshine Act: Roundtable Before 
the Special S. Comm. on Aging, supra note 281, at 1 (statement of Sen. Kohl, Chairman, Special  
Comm. on Aging). 
308. 155 CONG. REC. S788 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
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more about the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on the practice  
of medicine.”309  
b. State Statutory Protections for Informed Consent 
As detailed in Section III.B, supra, courts addressing claims by patients for 
violations of informed consent turned them into a species of medical malpractice 
with accompanying evidentiary complexities including expert testimony.310 
Common law disclosure requirements were inconsistent and evolved unpredictably 
since inquiries into the doctrine are so factually idiosyncratic.311 Without clear 
guidelines to follow, physicians did not know if their disclosure complied with 
judicially crafted requirements.  
Physicians turned to state legislatures to clarify the law of informed consent.312 
In response, state legislatures established procedures for disclosure, adopted 
consent forms as evidence of compliance with disclosure requirements, and 
authorized administrative processes to specifically list the risks the provider is 
expected to disclose.313 In the codification process, state statutes selected the 
standard under which informed consent liability was to be analyzed, many adopting 
patient-centered standards.314  
In 1996, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly codified its state’s common law 
doctrine of informed consent.315 The Act expanded its informed consent doctrine, 
established a standard that emphasized the patient’s perspective (“receiving 
information of the procedure, risks, and alternatives would have been a substantial 
factor in the patient’s decision”) and set forth the content of that consent.316 That 
informed consent must be obtained by the physician directly, and not through any 
agent or assistant.317 
 
309. Press Release, Special Comm. on Aging, U.S. Senate, Grassley, Kohl Say Public Should 
Know When Pharmaceutical Makers Give Money to Doctors (Sept. 7, 2007), https://
www.aging.senate.gov/press-releases/grassley-kohl-say-public-should-know-when-pharmaceutical-
makers-give-money-to-doctors [https://perma.cc/Z4X8-ER8F]. 
310. Leonard J. Nelson, III, Michael A. Morrisey & Meredith L. Kilgore, Medical Malpractice 
Reform in Three Southern States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69, 71 (2008); Sheldon F. Kurtz, The 
Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor Is Right” to “Patient Has Rights,” 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 
1245 (2000) (“Today, the right of a patient to participate to some extent in medical decision making 
affecting the patient is universally dictated by the ‘informed consent’ laws of all states.”). 
311. Sterken et al., supra note 84, at 115. 
312. Id. at 117. 
313. Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 193 (1994). 
314. Id. Jurisdictions were evenly split on whether to apply the reasonable patient or reasonable 
physician standard. 
315. Daniel A. Durst, Cutting Through Pennsylvania’s Medical Informed Consent Statute: A 
Reasonable Interpretation Abolishing the Surgical Requirement, 104 DICK. L. REV. 197, 202 (1999); Act 
of Nov. 26, 1996, No. 135, § 10(811-A), 1996 Pa. Laws 776, 789, repealed by Act of Mar. 20, 2002,  
No. 13, § 5104(a)(2), 2002 Pa. Laws 154, 197.  
316. Durst, supra note 315, at 218 n.164. 
317. Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 433 (Pa. 2017). 
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Enacted in 1971, the Georgia Medical Consent Law provided a broadly 
worded obligation upon physicians to disclose the “treatment or course of 
treatment” and, having done so, only claims of fraud could be asserted by 
patients.318 When the Georgia Court of Appeals interpreted this statute in 1975, it 
ruled that the common law doctrine of informed consent simply did not apply in 
the state of Georgia.319 As a result, patients were left with one option: to recover 
under the theory that consent was obtained through fraud.320 The court’s strict 
interpretation of no informed consent in Georgia led the legislature to adopt the 
limited informed consent statute in 1988.321 The statute promoted patient autonomy 
through the adoption of the prudent patient standard.322 However, the statute “does 
not impose a general requirement of disclosure”323 upon physicians, but rather it 
requires disclosure that falls within six statutory categories for a specific list of 
surgical procedures.324 The statutory requirements include statute of limitations 
requirements, allows cause of action cases to be rooted in both malpractice and 
battery for failure to obtain basic consent, and imposes an affidavit requirement.325  
Informed consent statutes consistently have detailed disclosure requirements 
to ensure patient autonomy and physician responsibility. These statutes are 
influenced by the AMA’s lengthy guidelines addressing informed consent.326 For 
 
318. J. Harold Richards, Informed Confusion: The Doctrine of Informed Consent in Georgia, 37  
GA. L. REV. 1129, 1141 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(b)(2) (1991). 
319. Richards, supra note 318, at 1130; Young v. Yarn, 222 S.E.2d 113, 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975), 
overruled by Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
320. Richards, supra note 318, at 1142–43; see Spikes v. Health, 332 S.E.2d 889, 892  
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985). 
321. Richards, supra note 318, at 1144; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (2001). 
322. § 31-9-6.1(a)(3) (2001). 
323. Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 780 (Ga. 2000) (holding that the 
physician did not have a duty to disclose cocaine abuse habit since it did not fall within six  
statutory categories). 
324. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(a)(1) to (6) includes the six statutory factors  
listed below: 
(1) A diagnosis of the patient’s condition requiring such proposed surgical or diagnostic 
procedure; 
(2) The nature and purpose of such proposed surgical or diagnostic procedure; 
(3) The material risks generally recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians 
of infection, allergic reaction, severe loss of blood, loss or loss of function of any limb or 
organ, paralysis or partial paralysis, paraplegia or quadriplegia, disfiguring scar, brain damage, 
cardiac arrest, or death involved in such proposed surgical or diagnostic procedure which, if 
disclosed to a reasonably prudent person in the patient’s position, could reasonably be 
expected to cause such prudent person to decline such proposed surgical or diagnostic 
procedure on the basis of the material risk of injury that could result from such proposed 
surgical or diagnostic procedure; 
(4) The likelihood of success of such proposed surgical or diagnostic procedure; 
(5) The practical alternatives to such proposed surgical or diagnostic procedure which are 
generally recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians; and 
(6) The prognosis of the patient’s condition if such proposed surgical or diagnostic 
procedure is rejected. 
325. Richards, supra note 318, at 1145; Simpson v. Dickson, 306 S.E.2d 404, 406  
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
326. AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 2: Ethics of Consent, Communication & Decision Making, in 
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 2.1.1. 
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example, Oregon statute section 677.097 states a physician or physician’s assistant 
obtains informed consent by explaining: “(1) in general terms the procedure or 
treatment to be undertaken; (2) that there may be alternative procedures or methods 
of treatment, if any; and (3) that there are risks, if any, to the procedure  
or treatment.”327 
C. Competence and the Professional Standard of Care 
State legislatures have also been active in shaping the course of patients’ claims 
based on physicians’ duty of care, but in many respects, it is fundamentally tied to 
the nature of the role courts play in law.328 Under a fiduciary theory, the duty of 
care would require physicians to be educated and informed about the procedures, 
conditions, and surgeries they are administering.329 In reality, the inquiries are less 
objective and more subjected to competing expert witness testimony. 
Because courts have determined that claims against physicians are broadly 
negligence claims, there are constitutional (state and federal) and statutory limits as 
to the extent state legislatures and governors may intrude.330 Indeed, many 
legislative efforts aimed at shaping negligence claims against physicians have been 
struck down by state supreme courts.331 With an estimated seven to seventeen 
medical malpractice claims filed per 100 physicians every year, and those claims 
characterized as negligence claims, courts feel an understandable obligation to 
protect access to courts for those damaged through contractual breach or  
tortious injury.332  
State legislatures have endeavored to establish standards of care for physicians 
and to influence some evidentiary matters like qualification of expert witnesses. 
Nevertheless, the level of physician care gives rise to frequent seesaw conflicts 
between state legislatures and state courts. In the informed consent context, for 
example, in 1975, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin established a framework for 
patient claims and physician exculpation in Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine  
 
327. OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097(1)(a)–(c) (2019). 
328. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (stating that a 
defendant’s conduct is measured by the reasonable person standard, and comparing their conduct to 
that of a reasonable person in similar circumstances). 
329. Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 185, 
191 (2004); Moffett & Moore, supra note 143, at 109.  
330. Amy Jurevic Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in  
Medicine: E-Health, Medical Errors, and Technology Add New Obstacles, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 449,  
470 (2002). 
331. Watts ex rel. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (striking down 
damages caps); John v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 405 P.3d 681 (Okla. 2017) (striking down affidavit 
requirement); N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017) (striking down damages 
cap); Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement: Procedural 
Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U. DAYTON  
L. REV. 173, 180–81 (2006) (surveying major movements in tort reform). 
332. Moffett & Moore, supra note 143, at 109. 
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Ins. Co.333 In 1982, the Wisconsin legislature codified that framework for 
Wisconsin’s informed consent statute.334 Enacted in 1982, Wisconsin Statute 
section 448.30 provided that “a physician’s duty to inform ‘is driven by what is 
reasonably necessary for a reasonable person to make an intelligent decision with 
respect to the choices of treatment or diagnosis.’”335 In addition to supporting 
patients through the reasonable standard approach, codification of the listed 
exceptions originally stated in Scaria served to protect physicians from certain 
liability.336 In Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court expanded a physician’s duty by requiring physicians to 
disclose all diagnostic approaches.337 The Wisconsin legislature responded to Jandre 
with 2013 Wisconsin Act 111,338 which did not require the disclosure of information 
about alternative medical modes of treatments for any condition the physician has 
not included in his or her diagnosis at the time the physician informs the patient.339 
It also adopted a physician-centered standard. 
After Helling, the case discussed in Part III.C, supra, in which the Washington 
Supreme Court rejected custom as decisive of the standard of care, a number of 
state legislatures responded and proactively drafted legislation that defined the 
standard of care.340 In 1977, North Carolina enacted a statute with the specific 
intent of reflecting the common law practices of the state.341 Section 90-21.12 
requires expert witnesses for the plaintiff to (1) testify on the standard of care that 
the defendant-physician is held to and whether the defendant-physician violated 
that standard; and (2) show whether the defendant was the proximate cause of the 
 
333. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647, 652–53 (Wis. 1975) (establishing 
the legal standard and five exceptions that limited physician liability). 
334. WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2018); Michael Rohde, Information Overload: How the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Expanded the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1097,  
1103–04 (2013). 
335. Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627, 647 (Wis. 2012) 
(quoting Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 78 (Wis. 1995)). 
336. Scaria, 227 N.W.2.d at 653; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 448.30 (West 2018) (“[P]hysician’s duty to 
inform the patient under this section does not require disclosure of: (2) Detailed technical information 
that in all probability a patient would not understand. (3) Risks apparent or known to the patient. (4) 
Extremely remote possibilities that might falsely or detrimentally alarm the patient. (5) Information in 
emergencies where failure to provide treatment would be more harmful to the patient than treatment. 
(6) Information in cases where the patient is incapable of consenting.”). 
337. Sterken et al., supra note 84, at 104–05; Jandre, 813 N.W.2d 627. 
338. Assemb. B. 111, 101st Leg., 2003 Sess. (Wis. 2013). 
339. § 448.30(7). 
340. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (2019) (stating that a physician is only liable if the 
defendant failed to act as a reasonable medical professional in the circumstances). 
341. Tyson, supra note 144, at 112–13; see Casey Hyman, Setting the “Bar” in North Carolina 
Medical Malpractice Litigation: Working with the Standard of Care that Everyone Loves to Hate, 89  
N.C. L. REV. 234 (2010); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2011) (establishing relevant standard of 
care for medical malpractice actions). 
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plaintiff’s injuries.342 In Connecticut, the state legislature enacted section 52-184c.343 
Section 52-184c defines the standard of care and the qualification of expert 
witnesses.344 Additionally, section 52-184 strictly requires that a specialist can only 
testify for defendants who are specialists.345 Overall, thirty-two states have 
provisions regarding minimum qualifications for expert witnesses who testify in 
medical malpractice/liability cases.346 
State legislatures have also attempted to limit judicial oversight of the standard 
of care determination. Twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico have specific provisions providing for alternative dispute resolution 
(arbitration, mediation, or settlement conferences) in medical liability or malpractice 
cases. Seventeen jurisdictions—Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Utah, Virginia, the Virgin Islands, and Wyoming—have requirements that 
medical liability or malpractice cases be heard by a screening panel before trial.347 
Twenty-eight states have requirements for filing an affidavit or certificate of merit 
in order for a medical liability/malpractice claim to move forward.348  
D. Statutory Protection of Physician-Patient Confidentiality 
Physician-patient confidentiality protects information shared between a 
patient and her physician. Physician-patient confidentiality exists to protect those 
required to consult with physicians from disclosure of secrets, to prevent physicians 
from disclosing humiliating or embarrassing information about a patient, and to 
encourage patients to give full disclosure to their physicians.349 “The doctor-patient 
relationship requires confidentiality and privacy to work effectively.”350  
While the protection of patient information has a long history in medicine 
generally, formal legal protection of physician-patient communications is entirely 
statutory; it did not exist at common law before legislatures enacted  
physician-patient privilege statutes.351 Although some courts have upheld  
 
342. Hyman, supra note 341, at 240. See generally § 90-21.12. 
343. CHRISTOPHER REINHART, STANDARD OF CARE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 
(2003), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/jud/rpt/2003-R-0486.htm [https://perma.cc/S9GA-
75AA]; Jennifer S.R. Lynn, Connecticut Medical Malpractice, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 381, 392 (1992); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184c(a) (1991). 
344. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184c(a). 
345. Id. § 52-184c(b) (nonspecialists); id. § 52-184c(c) (specialists). 
346. Medical Liability/Medical Malpractice Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-medical-malpractice-laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2GP7-HUDK] (Aug. 15, 2011). 
347. Id. 
348. Id. 
349. See Perry v. Fiumano, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Div. 1978); BURR W. JONES, THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (6th ed. 2006). 
350. Brief Amici Curiae of the New England Journal of Med. et al. in Support of Petitioners at 
7, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 771329. 
351. Gerald L. Higgins, The History of Confidentiality in Medicine: The Physician-Patient 
Relationship, 35 CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 921 (1989); see Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Rowles, 520 
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physician-patient confidentiality as a physician’s fiduciary duty, legislatures have 
done a better job at protecting patient communications.352 New York was the first 
state to enact a physician-patient privilege statute in 1828, and currently, statutes 
have been enacted by the majority of U.S. states.353 Protections covered under 
physician-patient confidentiality differ state to state, but most statutes have 
common features.354 Generally, the privilege belongs to the patient and the patient 
has the right to expressly or impliedly waive the privilege.355 Most statutes maintain 
exceptions for certain public health reporting requirements, child abuse, injuries 
sustained by a lethal weapon, and other specific concerns, although these exceptions 
vary state to state.356  
Although there is no federal physician-patient evidentiary privilege in judicial 
proceedings, physician-patient confidentiality is addressed by the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).357 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule 
protects any electronic communication concerning a patient’s protected health 
information made by covered healthcare providers.358 Unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential patient information is prohibited.359  
Federal and state courts of varying jurisdictions have not recognized claims 
for breach of confidentiality outside of statutorily defined causes of action. For 
example, in Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, a mother who gave her 
daughter up for adoption sued the physician who delivered her daughter for 
revealing the mother’s identity to the daughter.360 The mother brought the lawsuit 
under a broad theory of breach of information obtained in a confidential or 
privileged relationship.361 The court refused to recognize a special cause of action, 
anchoring its analysis instead on the Oregon statute providing for discipline or 
disqualification of a physician who “wilfully or negligently divulge[ed] a  
professional secret.”362  
Geisberger v. Willuhn, an Illinois case, reached a similar conclusion, stating that 
breach of confidential relationship, breach of contract, and breach of privacy were 
 
P.2d 518 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429  
U.S. 853 (1976). 
352. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-21 
(2016); see also Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973). 
353. Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret, 39 
SMU L. REV. 661, 676 (1985), https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol39/iss2/3 [https:// 
perma.cc/XQF6-B8QJ]. 
354. See Hobbs v. Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 
(2013), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
83AY-8WTY]. 
358. Id. 
359. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (1996). 
360. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 527 (Or. 1985). 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 535. 
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not valid causes of action by a patient for a physician’s unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential information.363 The court in Geisberger also narrowly construed the 
statute protecting patient confidential information, stating that privileged 
communication only exists if the communication was necessary for the performance 
of a professional duty on the part of the physician, and communications must relate 
to the private, rather than the public, life of the patient.364 
Various courts have taken similar positions as the courts in Humphers and 
Geisberger.365 Furthermore, while some statutes establish a cause of action for breach 
of physician-patient confidentiality, some courts have only recognized  
physician-patient privilege as rule of evidence.366 Additionally, even when courts 
recognize a cause of action for breach of a physician’s fiduciary duty, they still reach 
outcomes adverse to the patient’s interest in confidentiality.367 By strictly construing 
statutes and not recognizing causes of action for breach of duty of confidentiality, 
courts have not protected patient confidentiality as well as legislatures. 
Several states have enacted legislation dealing with HIV/AIDS patients’ 
confidentiality.368 The legislative intent of HIV/AIDS statutes is twofold: to protect 
the general public from an incurable disease and do so without infringing  
HIV/AIDS patients’ confidentiality rights.369 Most HIV/AIDS legislation created 
new rights for HIV/AIDS patients who wish to remain confidential in legal 
proceedings and who wish to receive confidential HIV testing.370 On the other 
hand, legislatures sought to protect healthcare providers who give care to  
HIV-infected patients from being infected themselves.371 As a result, HIV/AIDS 
statutes not only provide confidentiality protection to patients, but they also allow 
exceptions for disclosure of confidential information.372 The twofold purpose of 
HIV/AIDS statutes was intended by legislatures to strike a balance between patient 
confidentiality and public health, and these statutes were intended to protect one 
without compromising the other. 
Courts, on the other hand, have ruled against protecting HIV/AIDS patients’ 
confidentiality in favor of public health. Regarding the seemingly simple notion of 
whether an HIV/AIDS patient could use a pseudonym during litigation, the court 
 
363. Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945, 946–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
364. Id. at 947–48. 
365. See, e.g., Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. 1965); Ruzzier v. Nw. Lake Forest 
Hosp., No. 1-16-1300, 2017 WL 2124349 (Ill. App. Ct. May 10, 2017); May v. N. Health Facilities, Inc., 
No. 2008-P-0054, 2009 WL 806927 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2009). 
366. See Quarles, 389 S.W.2d at 251–52; Davis v. Earls, No. W2000-00280-COA-R3-CV, 2001 
WL 589138 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2001). 
367. See Quarles, 389 S.W.2d at 251–52. 
368. FLA. STAT. § 381.004 (2018) (outlining informed consent procedures and confidentiality 
for HIV/AIDS patients); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242 (West 2018); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305 
/ 9 (2018). 
369. See Waddell v. Bhat, 571 S.E.2d 565, 566 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
370. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305 / 2, 305/9. 
371. Waddell, 571 S.E.2d at 566. 
372. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-21 (West 2016). 
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in Doe v. Hall ruled that use of a pseudonym is not protected by statute and the 
decision is at the trial court’s discretion.373 
In Smith v. Datla, the court ruled that the statute of limitations regarding  
HIV/AIDS patient confidentiality had run out, and the patient had no other 
remedy at common law or otherwise.374 The Smith case shows how unwilling courts 
are to construe statutes liberally or provide common law protections for  
patient confidentiality.  
At the federal level, not only do federal courts not recognize an evidentiary 
privilege arising from the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship,  
U.S. Supreme Court rulings have limited the reach of federal statutes that might 
support such a privilege. While HIPAA acknowledged that patient medical 
information is sensitive and must be kept private, federal courts have not allowed it 
to serve as the basis of an evidentiary privilege.375 In IMS v. Sorrell, the case striking 
down Vermont’s law protecting physician prescribing information, the ruling 
acknowledged the risk of exposing a patient’s prescription history because of 
increasingly sophisticated ways of identifying patients from otherwise deidentified 
sources, especially with access to physicians’ names and locations.376 Protections for 
genetic privacy, similarly, have been far more expansive in state and federal 
legislatures than in courts.377 
E. Good Faith 
As suggested in Parts I.A and II.E, the fiduciary duty of good faith generally 
and the physician’s duty specifically lack coherent or consistent meaning as courts 
have fashioned that duty.378 Courts have stated generally that because the 
relationship is based on trust and confidence, the utmost good faith must  
be exercised.379  
 
373. Doe v. Hall, 579 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
374. Smith v. Datla, 164 A.3d 1110, 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). 
375. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (“The physician-patient evidentiary privilege 
is unknown to the common law.”); United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696, 698–99 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding 
that there is no generally recognized physician-patient privilege), aff’d, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Burzynski Cancer Rsch. Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1311 (5th Cir. 1987) (“In the context of 
federal criminal proceedings, no physician-patient privilege exists.”); Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 
F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We do not think HIPAA is rightly understood as an Act of Congress 
that creates a privilege.”). 
376. Brief Amici Curiae of the New England Journal of Med. et al. in Support of Petitioners, 
supra note 350, at 8. 
377. See generally Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information: One Size 
Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 175 (2013). 
378. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 67 (stating that physicians have an obligation to “place 
patient’s welfare above the physician’s own self-interest”). 
379. Cates v. Wilson, 350 S.E.2d 898, 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), modified, 361 S.E.2d 734  
(N.C. 1987); see also Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of 
Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 370 (2009). 
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Under common law, a physician must exercise the utmost good faith.380 This 
doctrine’s requirements are self explanatory when it is easily recognizable that the 
physician is acting in bad faith.381 The generality of the good faith obligation 
provides a great framework for a physician’s career; however, the lack of 
enumerated steps to ensure physicians’ actions are made in good faith creates 
confusion. This lack of guidance and clarity makes physicians more susceptible to 
disciplinary or malpractice action.  
As a statutory matter, good faith has been used broadly to preserve the 
integrity of the physician-patient relationship against specific pressures like the 
provision of emergency treatment, the prescription of pain medications, and the 
special duties that accompany the protection of children.382 
A majority of state statutes have either explicitly defined “good faith” and/or 
have listed specific requirements for physician practices. For example, when 
prescribing a controlled substance which is a narcotic, the Illinois Controlled 
Substance Act clearly defines good faith to mean 
the prescribing or dispensing of a controlled substance by a practitioner in 
the regular course of professional treatment to or for any person who is 
under his or her treatment for a pathology or condition other than that 
individual’s physical or psychological dependence upon or addiction to a 
controlled substance . . . .383  
In addition, the Act specifically requires a physician in good faith to meet 
requirements for multiple prescriptions and to keep a record of all controlled 
substances received, administered, dispensed, or professionally used otherwise than 
by prescription.384 A physician also acts in good faith when prescribing or 
distributing a controlled substance or any other drug in the course of professional 
practice to relieve pain and suffering or diseases for a duration that is medically 
necessary.385 Delaware has similarly provided for the specific administration of 
naloxone, a drug used to treat opioid overdoses that may have significant side 
effects, requiring physicians to use it in good faith.386  
Equally important, state statutes actively limit a physician’s fear of future 
liability by providing a greater incentive to engage in emergency practices that could 
 
380. See, e.g., Black v. Littlejohn, 325 S.E.2d 469, 482 (N.C. 1985); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991); Hummel v. State, 196 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Ark. 1946) (quoting 
ALFRED W. HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE § 96 (1931)). 
381. See generally Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (1986) (finding that 
physician’s sexual relations with patient could violate duty of utmost good faith); N.Y. EDUC. LAW  
§ 6509 (McKinney 2008) (defining professional misconduct). 
382. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical 
Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 384–85 (2001). 
383. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570 / 102(u) (1971). 
384. Id. at 570 / 312(a), (a-5), (c), (d); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8331 (1978) (defining good 
faith in rendering emergency when a reason). 
385. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-214(b)(12) (2016); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2242  
(West 2007). 
386. See generally DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 3001G (2020). 
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potentially save lives.387 At common law, any emergency aid provided by a physician 
resulted in the creation of a physician-patient relationship where there was duty of 
reasonable care owed.388 “To encourage physicians to stop at the scene of an 
emergency, usually a roadside accident, and to render assistance to injured parties 
without fear of malpractice litigation,” states granted varying degrees of immunity 
from civil liability for physicians.389 Generally, these laws require (1) an emergency; 
(2) the absence of a legal duty to act; and (3) care provided in good faith.390  
Similarly, states offer the immunity for physicians who in good faith report or 
assist in investigations of an alleged child abuse or neglect.391 Pennsylvania law, like 
many states, provides a presumption of good faith for physicians reporting or 
participating in investigations related to child abuse.392 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the extension of fiduciary duties to more actors 
in society, while appealing to the hope for more people acting in the interest of 
others, may in fact not work in practice. Because fiduciaries are attributed to possess 
knowledge, skill, deliberation, discretion, and, generally, power and virtue, it is 
understandable to wish for more people to look and act as fiduciaries are theorized 
to do. Indeed, physicians play a central role in fiduciary narratives because they are 
fairly described by all of the panegyric attributes extended to attorneys, trustees, 
guardians, and other regulated professionals.  
Yet the attributes and the reality of the fiduciary relationship are different, 
critically so when it comes to holding fiduciaries to account for the virtues they are 
supposed to possess. The practice of medicine, like the practice of law, accounting, 
the stewardship of resources for others, and the protection of minors or 
incapacitated persons, occurs against a complex backdrop that implicates not only 
the entrustor’s relationship with the fiduciary but the fiduciary’s relationship with 
society more broadly. In the physician-patient context, this has led professional 
bodies, legislators, and regulators to draft complex, certainly imperfect systems to 
address pressures on fiduciaries’ loyalty, candor, competence, discretion, and even 
good faith. As this Article demonstrates, those systems accomplish more for greater 
 
387. Stewart R. Reuter, Physicians as Good Samaritans: Should They Receive Immunity for Their 
Negligence When Responding to Hospital Emergencies?, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 157 (1999). 
388. Colby v. Schawartz, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (Ct. App. 1978). 
389. Reuter, supra note 387; Pemberton v. Dharmani, 469 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) 
(quoting H.B. 4326, 78th Leg., 1975–1976 Sess. (Mich. 1975)) (“[T]he bill would encourage health care 
personnel to render emergency care in hospitals and other health care facilities.”). 
390. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1501 (2016) (defining the scope of immunity eligibility); 23 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6318 (2014). 
391. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.106 (West 1995); id. at § 261.104 (mandating that the 
content of a report include: “(1) the name and address of the child; (2) the name and address of the 
person responsible for the care, custody, or welfare of the child; and (3) any other pertinent information 
concerning the alleged or suspected abuse or neglect.”). 
392. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6318 (2014). 
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numbers of patients, physicians, and those with whom they work and live than 
judicially enforced duties are likely to achieve. 
 
